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I. INTRODUCTION
Several large lawsuits have recently been filed in Texas against foreign
governments or their instrumentalities. On December 6, 1979 E-Systems,
Inc. sued the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Bank Melli' on an agree-
ment to modify and improve two Boeing 707 planes, seeking damages in
excess of $23 million. Earlier this year, Electronic Data Systems Corpora-
tion, Iran, brought suit against the Iranian Government and several of its
departments to recover $16 million for breach of a data processing services
contract.2
The blowout of the Ixtoc well off the shore of Mexico on June 3, 1979
poured out more than 100 million gallons of oil and formed a giant slick
that found its way into Texas waters and onto Texas beaches. The result-
ing economic and environmental damage has led to several lawsuits
against Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), a company owned by the Mexican
Government, as well as two private corporations, SEDCO and Permargo.
These claims, which have now been consolidated into a single case, in-
clude a $155 million class action by Gulf Coast fishermen,3 a $100 million
suit by various utility and navigational districts for revenue losses, and a
$100 million action by representatives of affected hotels, restaurants, and
landowners.4
All these suits involve the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
("FSIA" or "Act").5 Since a number of significant cases against foreign
governments are also pending in other states, it would seem timely to re-
I. E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. CA-3-79-1487-G (N.D. Tex., filed
Dec. 5, 1979) (order denying motion for authority to serve process).
2. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (memorandum opinion granting preliminary injunction).
3. Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1979, at 4, col. 3.
4. In re SEDCO, Inc., No. H-79-1880 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 1979); interview with M.
Waller, District Court's Office, Nov. 26, 1979. These classes have not yet been certified. Id.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, & 1602-1611 (1976), as fully set out in Appendix A.
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view the application of this new legislation during its first three years of
existence.
The FSIA makes five major changes in the law:
(1) it creates a federal long-arm statute for suits against foreign
governments and their agencies or instrumentalities;6
(2) it eliminates in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction against for-
eign sovereigns;
7
(3) it vests exclusive authority in the judiciary to determine
whether a particular activity of a foreign sovereign is commercial;'
(4) it permits execution of a judgment against certain commercial
property of a foreign government;9 and
(5) it establishes venue provisions for suits against foreign govern-
ments and their instrumentalities.' 0
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Absolute Versus Restrictive Theories of Sovereign Immunity
Although article III of the United States Constitution expressly includes
suits against "foreign states" within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts," the Supreme Court ruled in 1812 in The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon'2 that foreign sovereigns were immune from suits in
United States courts. Reasons underlying this early doctrine of absolute
immunity" included the need to protect the dignity of the foreign sover-
eign, the inability of an American court to enforce a judgment against a
foreign sovereign, and the desire for reciprocal immunity for the United
States from suits in foreign countries.'"
This theory of absolute immunity was abandoned in 1952 when the
6. Id. § 1608.
7. Id. §§ 1609-1611.
8. Id. § 1602.
9. Id. § 1610.
10. Id. § 1391(f).
1I. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, andfireign States, Citizens or subjects." U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2 (emphasis added).
12. I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
13. The Supreme Court later explained the absolute theory of immunity more fully in
United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1876):
A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent. His own
dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents, prevents his appear-
ance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another sovereignty, except
in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily assumed.
Hence, a citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of another nation, must
seek redress through his own government. His sovereign must assume the re-
sponsibility of presenting his claim, or it need not be considered. If this re-
sponsibility is assumed, the claim may be prosecuted as one nation proceeds
against another, not by suit in the courts, as of right, but by diplomacy, or, if
need be, by war. It rests with the sovereign against whom the demand is made
to determine for himself what he will do in respect to it. He may pay or reject
it; he may submit to arbitration, open his own courts to suit, or consent to be
tried in the courts of another nation. All depends upon himself.
14. Comment, Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign-State Enterprise in Alaska, 4
UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 343, 347-48 (1975).
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State Department issued the famous "Tate Letter"' 5 announcing that the
Department would no longer assert immunity on behalf of friendly foreign
sovereigns in suits arising from private or commercial activity. Thereafter,
this restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was accepted as the prevail-
ing law in this country. 6
B. Role of the State Department
In the early part of this century, the Supreme Court began to place less
emphasis on whether immunity was supported by the law and practice of
nations and to rely instead on the practices and policies of the State De-
partment.' 7 This trend reached its culmination in Ex parte Republic of
Peru'8 and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman.'9 The foreign state, which had
the initiative, then could choose to seek a foreign immunity determination
either by asserting its claim directly in court or by requesting the State
Department to assert immunity on its behalf.
C. Commercial Versus Public Acts
The leading case to distinguish public activities from commercial activi-
ties under the restrictive theory was Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria20 v oiai
General de Abstecimientos y Transportes. Under Victory Transport
claims against a foreign state arising from the following political or public
acts would be barred by sovereign immunity: (1) internal administrative
acts, such as expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative acts, such as nationaliza-
tion; (3) acts involving the armed forces; (4) acts involving diplomatic ac-
tivity; and (5) public loans.2' This distinction between public and
commercial activities was followed in a number of subsequent decisions.22
D. Securing Jurisdiction over a Foreign Sovereign
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, there was no clear way to secure in
15. Letter from Jack B. Tate, State Department Acting Legal Advisor, to Acting Attor-
ney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984-85
(1952). Because the federal courts defer to an assertion of sovereign immunity made by the
Department of State on behalf of a foreign sovereign, the Department's definition of the
scope of sovereign immunity has frequently been controlling. See Pugh & McLaughlin,
Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 25, 55-64 (1966).
16. Alfred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976).
17. See Pugh & McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 58-64, suggesting that this judicial defer-
ence to State Department rulings is compelled by the constitutional political question doc-
trine; judicial rulings on such matters would unnecessarily interfere with the power of the
executive branch to conduct foreign affairs.
18. "[C]ourts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the
property of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in
conducting foreign relations." 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
19. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
20. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
21. Id. at 360.
22. Sea Transp. Corp. v. The S/T Manhattan, 405 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975);
see Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 985 (1971).
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personam jurisdiction over a foreign state. Because the assertion of juris-
diction inherently involves the imposition of the judicial power over the
party,23 a claimant could not "simply serve ...process on the physical
embodiment of the foreign government, because such embodiment-an
embassy or consulate-is inviolable. Service on an ambassador or minis-
ter of a foreign state [was] not only void, but under a federal statute dating
"124back to 1790 [was] a crime ....
A 1976 survey of American cases revealed that state long-arm statutes
had been applied, in appropriate situations, to acquire in personam juris-
diction over corporations incorporated in other countries, 25 but that these
state statutes had not been used to secure jurisdiction over foreign sover-
eigns.26
In Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece27 the Second Circuit held
that methods of service provided in rule 428 could not be used to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. Although the court al-
lowed Rule 8329 to be used for the purpose of giving notice to the defend-
ant, amenability to suit was found only because the defendant had
consented to jurisdiction.3' Absent such consent by a foreign government,
service on an agent of the government who is present within the jurisdic-
tion, in compliance with rule 4(d)(3), has never been held a sufficient
means of service upon a foreign state.3 '
The possibility of using a state long-arm statute to acquire jurisdiction
over a foreign government was raised in Republic International Corp. v.
Amco Engineers, Inc.32 The Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals indicated
that such an exercise of personal jurisdiction would not violate due proc-
ess. 33 Republic International, however, was decided on other grounds and
the court's dictum on this point of law may be incorrect.34 The issue of
whether jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign can be secured through a
23. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZ-
ARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 622-30 (2d ed. 1977).
24. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim-The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 377, 384 (1974) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 252, 253 (repealed by Dip-
lomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3(a)(1), 92 Stat. 808 (1978)). See also Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, openedfor signature Apr. 18, 1961, art. 22, § 1, 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.1.A.S. No. 7502.
25. Note, Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Cororations-4 Survey of U.S.
Practice, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345 (1976).
26. See notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text.
27. 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (process).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 provides: "Each district court... may from time to time make
and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. . . . In all cases
not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules."
30. 360 F.2d at 107.
31. See Note, Amenability of Foreign Sovereigns to Federal In Personam Jurisdiction, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 487, 490 (1974).
32. 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 167.
34. The court's opinion did not expressly analyze the public activity-commercial activ-
ity distinction, nor did it consider the foreign policy effects of sovereign immunity decisions.
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state long-arm statute is now before the Ninth Circuit in Insurance Co. of
North American & Crystal Boat Co. v. Marina Salina Cruz.
35
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, proceedings against a foreign gov-
ernment had been commenced only by an attachment against that govern-
ment's property within the state.36 In rem jurisdiction, involving claims to
title of the attached property, or quasi in rem jurisdiction, such as attach-
ing a bank deposit, were the "ultimate recourse open to private litigants"
because of the "lack of in personam jurisdiction against foreign sover-
eigns."37 Some plaintiffs obtained numerous attachments on foreign gov-
ernment assets located in various parts of the United States.38 This
shotgun approach caused significant irritation to many foreign countries.
As the House Report on the FSIA stated, "one of the fundamental pur-
poses of this bill is to provide a long-arm statute that makes attachment for
jurisdictional purposes unnecessary."39
E. Execution of Judgments Against Foreign Sovereigns
Despite the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as
to the right to sue a foreign sovereign, the absolute theory continued to
apply to execution of judgments. The State Department made this clear in
a letter, filed with the court in Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank.4"
Thus, any judgment rendered against a foreign government was not en-
forceable by execution. Such judgments merely formed a basis for possi-
ble enforcement outside the United States or for a request that the
Department of State present a diplomatic claim to the foreign government
on behalf of the successful litigant.4
III. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
A. Jurisdiction
To obtain jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign or one of its instrumen-
talities under the FSIA, three elements must be satisfied: subject matter
jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, and the service or notice provisions.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Federal district courts have original ju-
risdiction over foreign governments or their instrumentalities for any claim
35. No. 79-4050 (Alaska, filed Aug. 4, 1976).
36. See Pugh & McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 28-33.
37. Delaume, Three Perspectives on Sovereign Immunity, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399 (1977);
Legislative Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1225, 1239
(1974).
38. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6626, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1398, 1412 (1976).
39. Id.
40. 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1959). The State
Department maintained that the property of the foreign government should be "immune
from execution or other action analogous to execution." 192 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
41. R. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 43 (1978).
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with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.42 This
jurisdiction is without regard to the amount in controversy. Jury trials are
excluded.43
2. In Personam Jurisdiction. One of the major changes from prior law is
contained in the FSIA's provision of several bases for asserting in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a foreign state. The general rule of a foreign
state's immunity from jurisdiction is provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The
following series of exceptions to this immunity are listed in sections 1605
to 1607.
(a) Waivers of Immunity. A foreign state is not immune from the ju-
risdiction of United States courts or of state courts in any case in which it
has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication. A subsequent
withdrawal of such waiver is ineffective unless such withdrawal is in ac-
cordance with the terms of the waiver.
44
In Ipitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria45 a cement
sales contract contained a clause calling for arbitration by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce. A subsequent dispute was accordingly sub-
mitted to arbitration, and the plaintiff thereafter sought to have the foreign
award enforced in the United States pursuant to the United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.46 The Nigerian Government argued that as a sovereign it was
immune from such suit. The court, however, held that an agreement to
arbitrate or to submit to the laws of another country constitutes an implicit
waiver under section 1605(a)(1).4 7
An explicit waiver under this section was held to exist in Electronic Data
Systems Corp. Iran v. Social Security Organization of Iran.48 Such waiver
was found in the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights, executed by the United States and Iran in 1955. Article XI, section
4 of that treaty provides:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party. . . shall if it engages
in commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within
the territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy ei-
ther for itself or its property, immunity from suit. .. .
(b) Long-arm Provisions. Similar to state long-arm statutes, the FSIA
provides for jurisdiction over certain claims arising out of tortious acts or
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 1605(a)(1).
45. 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1400 (1978).
46. (June 10, 1958), 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.S.T.S. 3.
47. 465 F. Supp. at 826 (citing H.R. REP. 94-1487, supra note 38, reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6617).
48. No. CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (memorandum opinion granting pre-
liminary injunction).
49. 8 U.S.T. 901, T.I.A.S. No. 3888 (1955).
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commercial activities." Sufficient minimum contacts must exist between
the defendant foreign state and the United States to satisfy the due process
requirement established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. There
must be some nexus between the United States and the occurrence or
transaction underlying the suit so as not to offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. '52
(i) Commercial Activities. Suits against foreign sovereigns in-
volving commercial activities are permitted in three situations. The first
exception from sovereign immunity is an action based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state.53 The second is
a suit based on an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere. 4 Examples of these
types of foreign government activities include: a representation in the
United States by an agency of a foreign state that leads to an action for
restitution based on unjust enrichment, an act in the United States that
violates the federal securities laws or regulations, or the wrongful dis-
charge in the United States of an employee of the foreign state who has
been employed in connection with a commercial activity carried on in
some third country.5
The third exception arises when an act forming the basis for the suit
occurs outside the territory of the United States in connection with a com-
mercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.5 6 In NationalAmerican Corp. v. Federal Repub-
lic of Nigeria57 the court held that a breach of a "letter of credit having a
New York beneficiary, advised by and payable through New York banks,"
met the direct effect test of the third exception in section 1605(a)(2).58
Moreover, the minimum contacts test of Shaffer v. Heitner59 was satisfied
because the property that the plaintiff had attached prior to the effective
date of the FSIA was the same fund that formed the basis of the litigation.
Shortly thereafter a second judge in the Southern District of New York
found that the contacts with the United States in the case before him were
insufficient to satisfy the direct effect test. In Carey v. National Oil Corp.60
the Libyan Government-owned oil company had breached certain crude
oil supply contracts with Bahamian subsidiaries of a New York corpora-
50. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), (5) (1976).
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. Id. at 316.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
54. Id.
55. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 19, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6617-18, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1408.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
57. 448 F. Supp. 622, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1407
(1978).
58. Id.
59. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
60. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd, 592 F,2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979), reprintedin 17
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1180 (1975).
1016 [Vol. 33
FOREIGN SO VEREIGN IMMUNITIES A CT
tion. In refusing to assert jurisdiction the court noted that the defendant
had made a conscious effort to minimize contacts with the United States
and had made no attempt to avail itself of any of the protections or privi-
leges afforded by the United States.6 The Second Circuit affirmed, refus-
ing to pierce the corporate veil of the Bahamian corporations to find a
direct effect on the New York parent company.62
The direct effect test was also not satisfied in East Europe Domestic Inter-
national Sales Corp. v. Terra.63 A contract had been concluded in which a
Rumanian company was to sell cement to the plaintiff New York corpora-
tion. The plaintiff alleged that the contract was not performed because of
interference by Terra, a Rumanian state trading corporation. Suit was
brought against Terra for tortious interference with a trade or business.
Although Terra had dealt with other companies within the United States,
it had done so only through correspondence. Terra maintained no office in
the United States, sent no representatives or salesmen to this country, and
engaged in no organized publicity here. Sales to the United States
amounted to less than one percent of Terra's total sales. On these facts the
court decided there had been no real entering of the marketplace in the
United States 64 and concluded: "The alleged tortious activity took place
outside the United States. The purported injury took place in the United
States only because the plaintiff is domiciled or doing business here. This
.. . is an insufficient contact for due process purposes.",
65
In Upton v. Empire of Iran66 the plaintiffs, American citizens, were in-
jured when the roof of the international airport in Tehran collapsed. The
action was dismissed on the ground that causing injury to American citi-
zens abroad was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the District of
Columbia's long-arm statute,67 after which the federal long-arm statute
was patterned.68 Moreover, mere operation of an airport abroad did not
establish sufficient contacts with the United States under section 1605(a)(2)
of the FSIA to satisfy the International Shoe due process requirements.69
(ii) Noncommercial Torts. In addition to torts arising from
commercial activities that fall under the section 1605(a)(2) exception, the
FSIA authorizes jurisdiction for tort actions seeking monetary recovery for
personal injury, death, or property damage.7" This exception, however,
requires that the injury or damage be "caused by the tortious act or omis-
sion of that foreign state or any official or employee . . . while acting
61. 453 F. Supp. at 1101, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1186.
62. 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
63. 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), reprintedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 977 (1979).
64. Id. at 390, 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 982.
65. Id., 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 982.
66. 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), repnledin 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 103 (1979).
67. Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 132(a), 84 Stat. 549 (1970).
68. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 13, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6612, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1405.
69. 459 F. Supp. at 266.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
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within the scope ofhis office or employment."7 Moreover, the act or omis-
sion must have occurred within the United States.72 According to the
House Report, this provision was directed primarily to the problem of traf-
fic accidents.73 Nevertheless, one plaintiff is attempting to use this provi-
sion in an action against the Republic of Chile, its secret police agency,
and others for the murder of her husband, the Chilean Ambassador to the
United States under President Allende. Ambassador Letelier was killed in
Washington, D.C. in 1976 when a bomb planted in his car exploded. 4
This provision is also the basis of a personal injury claim arising from an
alleged machine gunning of a Florida lobsterman by three Bahamian gun-
boats during an apparent dispute over fishing rights. The plaintiffs, par-
ents of a wounded fisherman, a minor, claim that the incident took place
approximately sixty miles from the coast of Florida and within the 200-
mile United States domestic fishing zone.75
A section 1605(a)(5) exception from sovereign immunity is not available
when a claim is based on a discretionary function, regardless of whether
the discretion is abused.7 6 Similarly, it may not be used to bring claims
based on malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepre-
sentation, deceit, or interference with contractual rights. 77 In Yessenin-
Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency 78 the plaintiff sued newspapers owned by
the Soviet Government for libel based upon publication of the allegedly
defamatory articles outside the United States. Because the action fell
under section 1605(a)(5)(B), the court held that the Soviet papers were en-
titled to immunity. The plaintiff had argued that this suit should instead
be governed by section 1605(a)(2), ie., newspaper publication should qual-
ify as a commercial activity carried on outside the United States having a
direct effect within the United States. Unlike section 1605(a)(5), section
1605(a)(2) contains no prohibition against libel suits. Although conceding
that these newspapers were engaged in commercial activities, the judge
found that the alleged libels were not "in connection with a commercial
activity," but rather involved an "activity whose essential nature is public
or governmental. '79 Thus, this suit did not fall under section 1605(a)(2).
A similar argument was made in Electronic Data Systems (EDS).8 °
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 20-2 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6619, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1409.
74. Complaint, Letelier v. The Centro Nacional de Informaciones, No. 78-1477
(D.D.C., filed Aug. 8, 1978), cited in Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munity Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 201 n.9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Brower].
75. Complaint, Perez v. The Bahamas, No. 78-4110 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 30, 1978), cited
in Brower, supra note 74, at 201 n.14.
76. Zamnik v. Veterans Administration, Nos. 78-6009 & 78-7021 (2d Cir. Mar. 30,
1979), a f/'g 77 Civ. 1610 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1977) (slip op.).
77. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(5)(A), (B) (1976).
78. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 720 (1978).
79. 443 F. Supp. at 854, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 725.
80. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
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EDS alleged that the Government of Iran wrongfully and maliciously in-
duced other defendants to breach their contract. The Government of Iran
countered that under section 1605(a)(5)(B), a foreign sovereign may not be
sued for tortious interference with contractual rights. The court, however,
characterized the interference as a commercial tort falling under section
1605(a)(2)."' The opinion describes the "defendants'" (plural) actions as
commercial in nature. Such characterization may be appropriate for the
two agencies which may have actually breached the contract, the Social
Security Organization and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. But where
the "state" or the Government of Iran is concerned, exactly what conduct
is being labeled "commercial"? Any interference with the contract by the
Revolutionary Government of Iran may have resulted from a political or
public decision. As such, it would not qualify as a commercial act under
section 1605(a)(2) and hence would come under the 1605(a)(5)(B) bar. For
basically the same reason, the Southern District Court of New York stated
in Carey v. National Oil Corp. 82 that even if the case had not been decided
on other grounds, the actions of Libya would at most constitute a tortious
interference with contractual rights, and such claims are barred under sec-
tion 1605(a)(5)(B).I 2 a
(iii) Expropriation Claims. In a few limited situations, suits
based on an expropriation claim may be brought against a foreign sover-
eign under the FSIA. First, the property must have been "taken in viola-
tion of international law." 3 The House Report describes this as including
the nationalization or expropriation of property without payment of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation." It also includes takings
that are arbitrary or discriminatory."
In addition to an illegal taking, the claims must fall within one of the
following two categories. Under the first category are cases in which the
improperly taken property, or any property exchanged for such property,
is present within the United States and in which such presence is in con-
nection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state.8 6 This test could be satisfied, for instance, when a foreign
state expropriates a fleet of aircraft and uses these aircraft, or planes ex-
changed for them, to furnish commercial air services to the United
States.87 The second category of expropriations includes cases where the
seized property, or any property exchanged therefor, is owned or operated
81. Id. at 22 n.9.
82. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), af'dpercuriam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); see
text accompanying notes 60-62 supra; cf. East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra,
467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (federal district court has no personal jurisdiction; 28
U.S.C. § 1605's itemization of nonimmune transactions prescribes necessary contacts).
82a. 453 F. Supp. at 1102.
83. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3) (1976).
84. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 19-20, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6618, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 1408.
85. Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976).
87. R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 59.
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by an instrumentality of the foreign government, and that instrumentality
is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States. Under this situa-
tion, no property need be present in the United States in connection with
the commercial activity of the instrumentality of the foreign state.8" As-
sume again that a foreign government expropriates airplanes of a United
States citizen and uses them, or craft exchanged for them, to operate air
services anywhere in the world. If the state-owned airline is engaged in
any commercial operations within the United States, such as either com-
mercial air services to this country with planes unrelated to the expropri-
ated planes or substantial solicitation of business, then the foreign state
and its airline would be subject to suit under the FSIA.89
The House Report indicates that the act of state doctrine should not be
used to defeat claims under this section.9" Citing the Dunhill case,9 ' the
Committee concluded that the act of state doctrine is not applicable when
a commercial activity of a foreign sovereign involves significant jurisdic-
tional contacts with the United States.92
(iv) Property Rights. Section 1605(a)(4) denies immunity to
foreign sovereigns in litigation concerning real property located within the
United States. The question arises whether this provision applies to diplo-
matic and consular property. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations provides in article 22 that the "premises of the mission, their
furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the
mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execu-
tion." 93 The House Report on the FSIA interpreted this article as permit-
ting local courts to adjudicate questions of ownership, rent, servitudes, and
similar matters, as long as the foreign state's possession of its diplomatic or
consular premises is not disturbed.94
In County Board v. German Democratic Republic95 Arlington County,
Virginia, sued the East German Government for real estate taxes owed on
an apartment building in Arlington. The defendant's request for immu-
nity was denied on two grounds: ownership of these premises was com-
mercial in character, which brought the matter within section 1605(a)(2),
and the case involved rights in real property located in the United States,
which fell under section 1605(a)(4).96
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976).
89. R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 59.
90. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 20 n.l, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6618-19 n.I, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1408 n.I. See also 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2) (1976).
91. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
92. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 20 n.1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6618-19 n.I, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1408 n.l.
93. 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3228 T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
94. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 20, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6619, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1409.
95. No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 1978), reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1404,
1405-06 (1978).
96. 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1405-06.
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Immunity is also not available to the foreign state for claims involving
either real or personal property located within the United States when the
foreign government's interest in such property was created through gift or
inheritance. 97
(v) Maritime Liens. As in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction
may no longer be obtained against a foreign sovereign or its instrumentali-
ties,98 the FSIA establishes a method of securing in personam jurisdiction
for suits in admiralty to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of
a foreign state, providing the lien is based upon a commercial activity of
the foreign state.99 Although such jurisdiction is personal in nature, any
judgment against the foreign state may not exceed the value of the vessel
or cargo upon which the maritime lien arose. The value is to be deter-
mined as of the time notice of the suit is served.'0°
(c) Effect of an Appearance. An appearance by a foreign state in an
action does not confer personal jurisdiction with respect to claims that
could not have been otherwise brought under the FSIA.'0 The foreign
state thus may appear to contest jurisdiction without such an appearance
thereby constituting submission to jurisdiction. On the other hand, should
the foreign state file a responsive pleading without raising the defense of
sovereign immunity, such action would be considered an implicit waiver of
immunity under section 1605(1).
3. Elimination of In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction. Because the
prior practice of attaching property of foreign sovereigns to secure jurisdic-
tion annoyed other nations, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction against
foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities has been abolished. Thus,
property of a foreign government may no longer be attached as a means of
commencing a lawsuit.' 0 2 In National American Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria0 3 the plaintiff had attached defendant's property prior to the
effective date of the FSIA. Under New York law, certain technical defects
existed in the levy; once the FSIA became effective, plaintiff was unable to
remedy these defects since attachment was no longer available as a basis
for jurisdiction. The court, however, applied the in personam jurisdiction
provisions of the Act retroactively to permit the plaintiff to continue his
action. '04
The legislative policy against attachments to secure jurisdiction over for-
eign sovereigns is so strong that the FSIA provides if a plaintiff arrests or
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1976).
98. See id. §§ 1609-1610.
99. Id. § 1605(b).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 1330(c).
102. Id. § 1609.
103. 448 F. Supp. 622, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1407
(1978)..
104. 448 F. Supp. at 638-39, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413.
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attaches a vessel or cargo belonging to a foreign government, the plaintiff
will lose his in personam remedy and the foreign state will be immune
from suit.' °5 The only exception to this rule arises when the plaintiff was
unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved. 10 6 Ac-
cording to the House Report,0 7 this should be a rare situation because the
flag of the vessel, the circumstances giving rise to the maritime lien, or the
information contained in ship registries kept in ports throughout the
United States should make known the ownership of the vessel in question,
if not the cargo. On the other hand, evidence that a party relied on a
standard registry of ships that did not reveal a foreign state's interest in a
vessel is prima facie evidence of the party's unawareness that a vessel of a
foreign state was involved. ' 08
4. Service of Process. Section 1608 sets forth provisions on how service
of process is to be made on a foreign sovereign and its agencies or instru-
mentalities. Designed to ensure adequate notice to the defendant, these
provisions require translation of key documents, proper transmittal chan-
nels, and explanations of the legal significance of the proceedings. This
section sets forth the exclusive procedure for service: "[I1nformal notifica-
tion through channels clearly outside the obvious requirements of the ap-
plicable statute cannot be substituted for those which meet the
requirements." 109
Section 1608(a) establishes the procedures for service on a foreign state
or a political subdivision thereof; this subsection does not apply to service
on an agency or instrumentality of the foreign government. Subsection (a)
provides for a hierarchy in the methods of service. As a method of last
resort, paragraph (4) provides for service through diplomatic channels if
service cannot be made by mail within thirty days. This final alternative is
vital; the United States Postal Service refuses to accept mail for delivery to
certain countries when civil strife or other conditions make delivery un-
likely. " A notice of suit must be prepared in accordance with the form
set forth in Department of State Regulations,"' which also establish the
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(1) (1976); see Jet Line Serv., Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462
F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1978) (plaintiff lost in personam remedy by arresting ship owned by
Libyan Government).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(I) (1976).
107. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 22, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6620, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1409.
108. Id.
109. Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Republic of Congo to United Nations, 443
F. Supp. 816, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 714, 717 (1978). See
also 40 D 6262 Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates Gov., 447 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
110. See Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
111. 22 C.F.R. § 93.2 (1979); see Appendix B. See also U.S. Dep't State, Memorandum
of Judicial Assistance under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Service of Process
upon a Foreign State (May 10, 1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1177 (1979);
Letter from Lee R. Marks, Deputy Legal Adviser of State Dep't to Charles N. Brower (June
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procedures for service through diplomatic channels." 2
Section 1608(b) provides the methods by which service shall be made
upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. If, for example, a
contract contains a special arrangement for service, such procedure may be
used." 3 Similarly, service may be made upon an officer or appointed
agent of the foreign agency or instrumentality in the United States." 4 If
no special arrangement exists and if the defendant has no representative in
the United States, then one of three alternative methods may be available.
The first two options provide for either service by a letter rogatory" 15 or by
mail from the court with return receipt requested." 16 As a third means,
subparagraph 1608(b)(3)(C) authorizes the court to use any other method
of service, 1 7 provided it is "consistent with the law of the place where
service is to be made." It should be noted here that many civil law nations
tend to view service of process as an act of the sovereign that must be
carried out by an official of the court. Service by a private individual
within the territory of a foreign nation may be illegal. Most experts from
civil law countries have indicated that service of United States judicial
documents by mail is objectionable." 8
Compliance with the service provisions of the FSIA may not be easy,
especially where relations with the foreign government are less than ami-
cable. Electronic Data Systems' illustrates these difficulties. The plaintiff
therein sought to serve the Social Security Organization of Iran ("SSO")
and the Ministry of Health and Welfare of that nation ("Ministry"). As
''agencies or instrumentalities," normally they would have been served
under section 1608(b). Neither subparagraph (1) nor (2) could be used,
since no special arrangements existed with Iran and the defendants had no
authorized agent with the United States. Subparagraph 3(B), mail requir-
ing a signed receipt, was also unavailable because the United States Postal
Service was not accepting mail to Iran on Febrary 23, 1979, the date when
service was first attempted.
15, 1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1184 (1979) (discussing transmittal of diplo-
matic notes of foreign governments to United States courts).
112. 22 C.F.R. §93.1 (1979).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(1) (1976).
114. Id. § 1608(b)(2).
115. Id. § 1608(b)(3)(A). A letter rogatory is a formal request from the court to the court
of a foreign nation to perform some judicial act. 22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (1979).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3)(B) (1976).
117. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 83. See also Petrol Shipping Co. v. Kingdom of Greece,
360 F.2d 103, 107-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Note, supra note 31, at 489-
500.
118. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of the
Convention of 15 Nov. 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 21-25, 1977, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
312, 317 (1978). See also Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudi-
cial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Done Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.S.T.S. 163, reprinted in FED. R. Civ. P. 4, Notes; Carl, Service of
Judicial Documents in Latin America, 53 DEN. L.J. 455 (1976).
119. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction).
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To overcome this obstacle, the judge fashioned his own method by read-
ing into subparagraph 1608(b)(3)(C) the use of diplomatic channels pro-
vided for in 1608(a)(4), although subpart (a) of this section speaks directly
only to service on foreign governments or their political subdivisions. The
Government of Iran had also been named as a defendant in this suit, but
no attempt was made to serve the government at that time, because section
1608(a)(4) could not be used against a foreign government until a thirty-
day time period for service by mail under section 1608(a)(3) had expired.
As against the SSO and the Ministry, only the method established under
1608(a)(4), and not the thirty-day prerequisite, was read into section
1608(b)(3)(C). Under this reasoning, the court authorized immediate re-
sort to diplomatic channels against these two instrumentalities.
Accordingly, on February 23 the court ordered the Clerk to mail the
documents, return receipt requested, to the Director of Consular Services,
Department of State, in Washington, D.C. These papers were in turn sent
to the American Embassy in Tehran which transmitted them, together
with a diplomatic note, to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
March 27. A certified copy of the Embassy's diplomatic note was returned
and filed with the court in Texas on September 4.
The use of section 1608(a)(4), however, to serve these instrumentalities
of a foreign government apparently created some confusion. Although
this attempt was intended to apply only to the SSO and the Ministry, the
note from the American Embassy stated it was transmitting a summons on
"the Government of Iran" as well as the SSO and the Ministry. Moreover,
the documents were not sent directly to the SSO or the Ministry, but rather
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran with a request that they be for-
warded to the appropriate authorities.
Meanwhile, the plaintiff sought to effect service of process through an
alternative route. On March 12 the court issued an order authorizing the
mailing of the papers to the SSO and the Ministry "from any point of
origin" with a return receipt required. On March 15 copies of the docu-
ments were mailed to these two agencies from Paris, France by an em-
ployee of the plaintiff. This March 12 order had been based on section
1608(b)(3)(C), which authorizes any method "directed by ...the court
consistent with the law of place where service is to be made." The public
record does not indicate whether an inquiry was made to determine if such
mailing was "consistent" with the law of either France or Iran. In France,
service on persons living outside that nation is made by a huissier (a court
official) delivering the papers to the State Attorney of France; thereafter
certified copies are forwarded to the defendant by registered mail, return
receipt required.' The term "where service is to be made" in section
1608(b)(3)(C) also raises an issue of private international law. Has this
attempted service been "made" in France or in Iran? In any event, the
1939 Code of Civil Procedure of Iran was "largely inspired by French
120. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1033-3, cited in H. DE VRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAWYER 197 (1975).
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law." '21 As the documents were never delivered to the State Attorney of
France, it is possible this mailing by the plaintiffs employee would be in-
valid under both French and Iranian law.
As of June 21, no receipts had been returned on the papers mailed from
France, nor had a copy of the American Embassy's transmittal note been
returned to the court. Nonetheless, the judge concluded that service had
been attempted on the SSO and on the Ministry in compliance with section
1608. The lack of "proof of receipt" of service did "not mandate dismissal
at this time" nor prevent the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 122
Despite the inclusion of the Government of Iran within the diplomatic
note of March 27 from the American Embassy, the court held that no le-
gally effective service had been made on the Government of Iran. The
plaintiff argued that the Government had actual notice and was, in fact,
participating through counsel in the hearings. Refusing to accept this ar-
gument, the court reasoned that under section 1330(b) and (c) a foreign
government cannot be subject to a claim solely by virtue of an appearance;
personal jurisdiction over such a defendant exists only for claims arising
out of those transactions or occurences specifically enumerated in sections
1605 to 1607. Thus, the Government of Iran had not been served as re-
quired under the FSIA; neither had it "made an appearance sufficient for
all purposes." '23 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Government's
actual knowledge of the lawsuit was sufficient to support a preliminary
injunction against removal of assets. A different quantum of appearance
was considered necessary for this emergency relief.
The June 21 opinion of the court also permitted the plaintiff "to con-
tinue its efforts to effect service on the Government of Iran." In the
meantime, the United States Postal Service had begun accepting mail to
Iran, and the court clerk on April 11 mailed copies of the papers to the
Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SSO, and the Ministry. Ap-
parently, the mailing to the Government of Iran was intended to satisfy
section 1608(a)(3), and that to the SSO and the Ministry to satisfy
1608(b)(3)(B).
On June 20, another effort was made to effect service through diplomatic
channels under section 1608(a)(4). The previous mailing to the Govern-
ment of Iran on April 11 was viewed as satisfying the thirty-day require-
ment of section 1608(a)(3), so that subparagraph (4) now became available
for service on the government. This time, papers directed toward the Gov-
ernment, the SSO, and the Ministry were mailed by the court clerk to the
Director of Special Consular Services of the Department of State in Wash-
ington, D.C. On July 11 the State Department forwarded these papers,
together with a diplomatic note, to the Embassy of Iran in Washington,
D.C. A certified copy of that transmittal note was returned and filed with
121. I INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1-52 (V. Knopp ed.
1975).
122. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F, at 7.
123. Id. at 10.
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the court on July 31. This particular means of service raises one question.
The diplomatic channel utilized by the State Department was transmittal
to the Iranian Embassy in Washington, D.C., rather than the normal
method of forwarding to the American Embassy in Tehran for delivery to
the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Section 1608(a)(4) merely states
that the papers shall be transmitted "to the foreign state." The House Re-
port, however, indicates that diplomatic channels can also include trans-
mittal by the Department of State to the embassy of the foreign nation in
Washington, D.C. The only requirement is that the "papers be transmitted
in such a way that the foreign state has actual notice."'
' 24
The two attempts to serve the defendant by mail--on March 15 and on
April 11-have never produced any return receipts. One might argue for a
presumption that an envelope properly addressed will be delivered in due
course. This proposal seems dubious in light of the situation in Iran as of
the end of 1979. Moreover, section 1608(c)(2) of the FSIA provides that
service "shall be deemed to have been made . . . as of the date of receipt
indicated in the . . . signed and returned postal receipt. . . ." Hence, the
attempts to serve these defendants by mail would seem to be ineffective.
In contrast, when the documents are transmitted through diplomatic
channels, there is no requirement that the foreign state formally accept
them. "'25 Section 1608(c)(1) provides that service is deemed "made. . .as
of the date of transmittal . . . of the diplomatic note." The effective date
of the service on the Foreign Ministry in Tehran would thus be March 27,
while that on the Embassy of Iran in Washington, D.C. would be July 11.
Although the March 27 service did not apply to the Government of Iran,
the July 11 service on that government would seem to do so.
The only remaining question is whether section 1608(a)(4) may properly
be brought in through section 1608(b)(3)(C) to permit the use of diplo-
matic channels for the March 27 service on the SSO and the Ministry.
Section 1608(b)(3)(C) requires that the method selected by the court be
consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made. The deci-
sion does not mention what Iranian law is on this point. Nonetheless, for-
eign objections to American methods of service usually relate to our more
informal practices, such as service by mail or by private individuals. Con-
versely, use of official channels such as a letter rogatory or a diplomatic
note is widely accepted throughout the world. In absence of proof to the
contrary, it would seem reasonable to assume no local law had been vio-
lated by the use of diplomatic channels to serve these two instrumentali-
ties.
The reader should recall that section 1608(b)(3)(C) was also construed to
permit service on an agent or instrumentality without compliance with the
provision in section 1608(a)(4) that limits diplomatic channels to those
124. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 24, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6623, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1411.
125. Id. at 25, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6624, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at
1141.
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cases in which service by mail cannot be made within thirty days. This
result should be compared with the holding in E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic ofIran,'26 in which the court refused to authorize service through
diplomatic channels under section 1608(a)(4) because the plaintiff had not
yet attempted to serve the defendant by mail under section 1608(a)(3), and
thus the thirty-day period had not started to run. The court reasoned that
use of diplomatic channels was intended by Congress to be the method of
last resort in order to minimize the burden on United States diplomats.
Although the court took judicial notice of the turmoil in Iran during De-
cember 1979, it noted that "much can happen in a 30-day period. . . . It
is possible that normal mail communications and normal relations be-
tween the United States and Iran will resume within that period or that the
present mail delivery will suffice."' 2 7 Thus, the plaintiffs request was
treated as premature.
To the extent the E-Systems ruling is limited to the Government of Iran,
the holding is not inconsistent with that in the Electronic Data Systems
case. But E-Systems had also named as a defendant the Bank Melli, a
government-owned Iranian corporation. Had the court wished to follow
the Electronic Data Systems approach, resort to diplomatic channels for
service could have been authorized at once against this agency or instru-
mentality. The facts of the two cases do differ on one point. The United
States Post Office was not accepting mail to Iran on the date of the Elec-
tronic Data Systems ruling in question; 28 in E-Systems there was no asser-
tion that mail to Iran had been halted. Hence, in theory there may have
been less basis in E-Systems to waive the time requirement. From a prac-
tical standpoint, however, this distinction seems irrelevant since, at the
time of the E-Systems decision, American Embassy personnel were hos-
tages in Tehran. Authorization to use diplomatic channels must have ap-
peared futile. Under these circumstances, there is probably considerable
merit in the position that the thirty-day time period in the notice provi-
sions of the FSIA should be strictly applied. A reasonable waiting period
is often indispensable to working out difficult problems in foreign rela-
tions.
Moreover, the complaint in E-Systems stated that the Bank Melli main-
tains an "agency office" in New York "where it may be served with proc-
ess."' 29 Thus, the plaintiff seemingly had available an easy method of
service on the bank under section 1608(b)(2). This method may be used on
the plaintiffs own initiative, for, as the court noted, "the statute does not
require judicial approval for the issuance of process ...[and] does not
require that leave of court be obtained for proper service of process."'
' 30
126. No. CA-3-79-1487-G (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 1979) (order denying motion for authority
to serve process).
127. 7d. at 4.
128. No. CA-3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex., order filed Feb. 23, 1979).
129. No. CA-3-79-1487-G (N.D. Tex., complaint filed Dec. 5, 1979).
130. No. CA-3-79-1487-G (N.D. Tex., Dec. 6, 1979) (order denying motion for authority
to serve process).
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Informal notification outside the channels authorized by section 1608 is
not permissible, and literal compliance with those provisions should usu-
ally be required. Nevertheless, there may be situations where some leeway
would be appropriate. Within a purely domestic context, American courts
are apt to apply service requirements quite strictly because service often
confers jurisdiction over the defendant in the sense of the power or the
right of the court to hear the case.' 3 ' In contrast, under the FSIA, service
does not perform this function; instead, jurisdiction over the foreign state
must be separately predicated on one of the grounds listed in section 1605
or 1607. The role of service is solely to provide notice. In Electronic Data
Systems the defendants that had appeared through counsel certainly had
received notice by some means; to dismiss this action because of a possible
technical defect in service would seem unduly harsh. Once a plaintiff has
made a good-faith effort to comply with section 1608, and the defendant
has either received the requisite documents, as well as translations thereof,
through one means or another, the court should be liberal in treating the
service requirements of the FSIA as satisfied. Such result would seem es-
pecially warranted when the defendant has actually appeared in the litiga-
tion.
Special notice provisions govern the enforcement of maritime liens
against foreign governments. 132 Designed to allow a plaintiff to institute
suit without arresting the vessel or cargo of a foreign sovereign, the FSIA
provides that a copy of the summons and complaint must be delivered to
the master or other person having possession of the cargo or vessel. In
addition, the plaintiff must endeavor to make service pursuant to section
1608 on the foreign government or instrumentality owning the vessel or
cargo. In this situation, however, it is not necessary to prove under section
1608(c) that the papers actually reached the foreign government or instru-
mentality. 133
B. Entities to Which Act Applies
In addition to granting immunity to foreign states and their political
subdivisions, the FSIA applies to any "agency or instrumentality of a for-
eign state." ''4 To qualify as an agency or instrumentality, three require-
ments must be satisfied. First, the entity must be a separate person,
corporate or otherwise. Secondly, it must be an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or alternatively, a majority of its shares or
other ownership interest must be held by a foreign state or political subdi-
vision thereof. Finally, it cannot be a citizen or a state of the United States
nor be created under the laws of any third country. 135
131. See e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959); R. CRAMTON, D.
CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 575 (2d ed.
1975).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 1603(b).
135. Id.
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In Yessenin- Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency' 36 the plaintiff argued that
Novosti was not owned by the state and therefore was not an instrumental-
ity entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Novosti, an informa-
tion agency of the Soviet public organizations, supplied certain materials
to foreign media for a fee and exchanged information with both domestic
and foreign media services. The Soviet Government provided Novosti
with free use of transmission facilities, furniture, equipment, and several
buildings. Other buildings were leased by Novosti from the Soviet Gov-
ernment. Novosti had its own fixed assets, and the Soviet state bore no
responsibility for Novosti's business activities or financial obligations. The
plaintiff contended that the defendant's right to use certain state property
free of charge did not mean that it was owned by the state. The court,
while pointing out that the statute's reference to ownership was "ill-suited
to concepts which exist in socialist states," nevertheless found that Novosti
was an agency or instrumentality within the meaning of the FSIA, because
the socialist state ultimately is the sole owner of all means of produc-
tion. 137
In contrast, in Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko , 38
a district court held that the defendant, a Yugoslav workers' organization
established 'to construct and operate a nuclear power plant, was not an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state within the meaning of the
FSIA.'3 9 Focusing on the degree of government control over the entity,
the court pointed out that the Yugoslavian Government did not subsidize
the defendant (NEK), held no seats on NEK's board, and took no direct
hand in the daily management of NEK's operations. The court indicated
concern that if a nation's system of ownership were alone determinative of
whether an entity is an agency or instrumentality under the Act, then every
entity of a socialist state could be so classified.' 4
0
In Herzberger v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, SA.'14' the defendant
organization sought removal from state to federal court under the FSIA.
The plaintiff argued that defendant was not an agency or instrumentality
within the meaning of the statute and therefore was not entitled to re-
moval. The defendant, a Chilean corporation, was ninety-five percent
owned by CORFO, an entity in turn wholly owned by the Republic of
Chile. On these facts the court concluded that the defendant did qualify as
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 142
In United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics143 the
plaintiff sued the USSR, its Ministry of Culture, and the State Concert
Society of the USSR (Gosconcert) on a contract to send performing artists
136. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 720 (1978).
137. 443 F. Supp. at 852, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 721.
138. 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
139. Id. at 831-32.
140. Id. at 831.
141. 78 Civ. 2451 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1978) (slip op.).
142. Id.; see Brower, supra note 74, at 203 n.25.
143. 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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to the United States and the United Kingdom. Both the USSR and the
Ministry of Culture claimed they were entities distinct from Gosconcert
and thus not liable for its debts or commitments. The court, refusing to
dismiss the complaint against these two defendants, noted the complaint
alleged that the negotiations had been conducted by at least one official of
the Ministry of Culture and that the contracts had been approved by the
Ministry. 144
The FSIA may apply to international organizations as well as foreign
states. In Broadbent v. Organization of American States 45 a former em-
ployee of the Organization of American States sued for an alleged breach
of an employment contract. Although finding the FSIA inapplicable, the
district court upheld the defense of immunity on the independent ground
that international organizations are immune from legal process except in-
sofar as that immunity is expressly waived by treaty or limited by stat-
ute. 146 This case is now on appeal before the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 47 An amicus curiae brief
filed by the United States in the appeal urges that the FSIA should govern
suits brought against international organizations. 48  Nevertheless, the
United States recommends affirmance of the lower court decision on the
ground that the subject of the suit, management of an international organi-
zation's civil service, is not a commercial activity within the meaning of the
FSIA. 14
9
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) may not
be sued under the Act according to International Association of Machinists
v. OPEC.' 50 The FSIA, it was reasoned, applies only to foreign sover-
eigns, and OPEC is not a sovereign.
Jurisdiction over questions involving employees was explored in State
Bank of India and Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers, AFL-CIO before the National Labor Relations Board '' Ninety-
two percent of the State Bank of India's stock was owned by the Reserve
Bank of India, which was in turn wholly owned by the Government of
India. The Reserve Bank performed many functions similar to those of
144. Id. at 612.
145. No. 77-1974 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 1978) (slip op.), citedin Brower, supra note 74, at 204
n.28.
146. Id. slip op. at 2.
147. No. 78-1465 (D.C. Cir., docketed May 25, 1978), citedin Brower, supra note 74, at
204 n.30.
148. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Broadbent v. Organization of Am.
States, No. 78-1465 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 18, 1978), cited in Brower, supra note 74, at 204
n.31.
149. For a description of the amicus briefs filed by the United Nations and by the World
Bank in this case, see Gordon, A Review of Significant Recent Decisions, Legislative, Executive
andAdministrative Actions in the United States, and Abroad, and of Treaties and International
Organization Developments, 13 INT'L LAW. 371, 381 (1979).
150. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
151. 229 N.L.R.B. 838, 95 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
853 (1977). See also S.K. Prods. Corp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1211, 95 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1977); Note,
International Law--Labor Law--N.L.R.B. Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns Operating
Within the United States, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 459 (1978).
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the United States Federal Reserve Bank, and the State Bank of India acted
as agent of the Reserve Bank of India. Nevertheless, the NLRB success-
fully asserted jurisdiction over a dispute regarding the Chicago branch of
the State Bank on the theory that the office "partakes of the nature of an
instrumentality of commerce."' 52 Although the FSIA does not apply to
administrative proceedings, 5 3 the NLRB referred to this statute to buttress
its jurisdictional finding:
While we recognize that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 affords judicial, not administrative, determinations of rights
growing out of such activities, we believe that it is further support for
our decision to treat foreign state enterprises coming within our juris-
diction as we would private individuals under like circumstances.'
54
C. Distinction Between Public and Commercial Activities
The difficulty of determining which activities are commercial is not lim-
ited to the area of labor relations. Because the major exception from sov-
ereign immunity is based upon commercial activities, the distinction
between public and commercial activities is vital. The FSIA defines "com-
mercial activity" as either "a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act." '  The legislative intent re-
flected in the House Report suggests that the courts will have a great deal
of latitude in determining what is a commercial activity. 156 Foreign gov-
ernmental activities intended to be included within the ambit of commer-
cial activity are sales of a service or product, leasing property, borrowing
money, and purchases of securities in an American corporation.157 The
term "regular course of commercial conduct" includes the carrying on of a
commercial enterprise such as an airline, a mineral extraction company, or
a state trading corporation. 158 Even a single contract could constitute a
"particular transaction or act." 159
The phrase "commercial activity" is defined by reference to the nature
of the conduct or transaction rather than by reference to its purpose. 1
60
The broadest application of this nature of the activity test would afford
immunity to the sovereign only when the act is of such nature that no party
other than a government could perform such an act. Because an individ-
152. 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 859.
153. See Brower, supra note 74, at 209; Brower, Litigation of Sovereign Immunity Before a
State Administrative Body and the Department of State.- The Japanese Uranium Tax Case, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 438 (1977).
154. Case 13-RC-14061 (May 20, 1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 865.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
156. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6615, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1407.
157. Id.
158. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6614-15, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1406.
159. Id.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). This analysis is nearly identical to the governmental
versus proprietary analysis used in determining the tort immunity of municipal corpora-
tions. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 977-84 (4th ed. 1971).
1979] 1031
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ual can borrow money, a foreign state that borrows money would be con-
sidered as engaging in a commercial activity under this test. Conversely,
because an individual cannot legislate, a state acts jure imperil when it
passes legislation.' 6 '
The rejection of the purpose test by the FSIA renders questionable the
continuing validity of Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abas-
tecimientos y Transportes.'62 The court in that case considered both the
nature and the purpose of the activity; consequently, the court classified
public loans and acts "concerning the armed forces" as "political or public
acts."' 16 3 In contrast, the House Report states that a contract to make re-
pairs on an embassy building or a contract to buy provisions or equipment
for the armed forces would be a commercial activity. 164 In NationalAmeri-
can Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria'65 the defendant claimed immu-
nity in a suit based upon a contract for cement to be delivered in Nigeria,
because some of the cement was intended for use in governmental works
and military installations. The court held this transaction was a commer-
cial arrangement, despite the possible military use. No convincing proof
had been submitted at the trial to show that a major or substantial portion
of the cement was procured with a governmental purpose in mind. More-
over, under the FSIA, the court stated the purpose of the purchase would
be irrelevant. 6
6
On the other hand, property under the control of a military authority or
defense agency, as well as property of a military character, is exempt from
execution.' 67 By restricting the plaintiffs right to execute on his judgment,
this subsection may have the practical effect of adopting Victory Trans-
port's classification of immunity with regards to "acts concerning the
armed forces."'
168
Ownership of the Windsor Park Towers apartment building by the East
German Government was considered a commercial activity in County
Board ofArlington County v. Government of the German Democratic Repub-
lic.16 9 In contrast, the alleged libel in Yessenin-Volpin was treated as a
governmental activity, rather than a commercial act.' 70  In United
Euram 7 ' a cultural project of the Soviet Government to supply perform-
161. R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 49.
162. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964) (agreement by defendant to arbitration in New York of
disputes arising under its charter party with plaintiff constituted consent to jurisdiction); see
R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 52.
163. 336 F.2d at 360.
164. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 16, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6615, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1406.
165. 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1407 (1978).
166. 448 F. Supp. at 641-42, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1416.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) (1976).
168. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964); see R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 61.
169. No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va., filed Sept. 6, 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
1404 (1978).
170. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 720 (1978);
see text accompanying note 78 supra.
171. 461 F. Supp. 609, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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ing artists was considered a commercial activity, but in Gittler v. German
Information Center,172 work done on making films for the German Infor-
mation Center was held to be a noncommercial diplomatic activity "in
connection with fostering cultural relations and promoting understanding
between Germany and the United States."
The question arises whether a foreign government's breach of a conces-
sion contract falls within the purview of the FSIA. In granting the conces-
sion, a government could be viewed as engaging in a commercial act. A
subsequent expropriation of the concession would also involve a breach of
that contract, which act might arguably be commercial. If the concession
holder is a United States company with United States shareholders, it
should be possible to demonstrate that such breach has a "direct effect on
the United States."' 73 On the other hand, in Carey v. National Oil
Corp.,174 where Libya had nationalized oil concessions, the court granted
sovereign immunity to that nation because "nationalization is the quintes-
sentially sovereign act, never viewed as having a commercial character." 175
Section 1605(a)(3), involving expropriations, however, does not make
jurisdiction turn on a commercial-noncommercial dichotomy. Hence,
could the breach of a concession contract provide the basis for a suit for
expropriatory action under this subsection? This expropriation provision,
however, presents another obstacle to suits on concession contracts. It ap-
plies only to cases involving "rights in property taken in violation of inter-
national law." While the phrase "rights in property" is not defined in the
statute nor discussed in the House Report, the phrase "claim of title or
other right to property" is used in the Hickenlooper Amendment, 176 which
limits the application of the "act of state" doctrine in expropriation cases.
The cases interpreting this amendment have consistently held that "claims
of title or other right to property" do not extend to claims based on con-
tracts. 177 An analogy to these Hickenlooper cases would point toward lim-
iting the phrase "rights in property" in the FSIA to claims asserted against
specific property. If this interpretation is followed, a claim based on
breach of a concession agreement would not fall within section
1605(a)(3). 178
To what extent the United States antitrust laws are included within the
concept of commercial activities in the FSIA is unsettled. In Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel179 the defendant entity, which was owned by the
Polish Government, was sued for antitrust violations. The court held the
172. 95 Misc. 2d 788, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600, 601-02 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1978).
173. R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 58.
174. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
175. Id. at 1102.
176. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
177. Menendez v; Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 425 U.S.
991 (1976); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1968); see Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F. Supp.
461 (W.D. La. 1975).
178. R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 60-61.
179. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
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alleged conduct fell within the category of commercial activities under the
FSIA, pointing out that the House Report had indicated the FSIA was
"not intended to alter application of the Sherman Antitrust Act. . .to any
defendant."' 8 ° Pezetel was also described as "some type of undefined as-
sociation existing under the laws of Poland for the purpose of conducting a
business in a state-controlled economy."'"' Thus, Pezetel did not qualify
as a foreign "state," but rather would be a "person" liable under the anti-
trust laws. 8 2
On the other hand, member nations of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) are not persons within the meaning of the
antitrust statutes, according to International Association of Machinists v.
OPEC.'83 Thus, a foreign state can sue' 84 but cannot be sued under the
antitrust laws. In addition, this case held the conduct of the OPEC nations
was not a commercial activity within the scope of section 1603(d).' 85
These countries, when controlling production of and prices for crude oil,
are establishing the terms and conditions for removal of natural resources
from their territory. United Nations Resolution No. 1803,186 with the con-
currence of the United States, recognized the principle that a sovereign
state has sole power to control its natural resources. Hence, the court con-
cluded, the OPEC nations are engaged in "sovereign" activities, not com-
mercial ones. This case is now being appealed. 87
In conversations, the author has found that a number of foreign attor-
neys believe the United Nations resolutions,188 and cases such as Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, mean that no activities in the petroleum
or natural resources industries will be treated as commercial. As far as
United States courts are concerned, such a belief is probably mistaken.
The InternationalAssociation of Machinists decision pointed out that a dis-
tinction must be made between those activities that are of a sovereign or
public nature and those that merely involve a government's proprietary
interest. The basic objective, according to the court, is "to keep our courts
180. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 19, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6618, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1408.
181. 461 F. Supp. at 396.
182. Even if the foreign entity is characterized as a "person" under the antitrust laws, the
suit may still be dismissed under the act of state doctrine. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d
68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). For factors to be weighed in deciding whether
to apply the doctrine, see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976), and Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1247 (1977).
183. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
184. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
185. 477 F. Supp. at 569.
186. G.A. Res. 1803 § I(1), 17 U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm'n 327, U.N. Doc. A/C 2/5 R 850
(1962).
187. Lehner, Machinist Chief Talks a Blunt Radical Line, Wins Many Admirers, Wall St.
J., Nov. 28, 1979, at I, col. 1, & at 24, col. 1.
188. See also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, ch. II,
art. 2(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1974), and Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order in 1974, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), § 4(e), U.N. GAOR, 6th
Spec. Sess, Supp. (No. 1), 3 U.N. Doc. A/9559.
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away from those areas that touch very closely upon the sensitive nerves of
foreign countries." 8 9 Under this reasoning, it is unlikely that foreign sov-
ereigns will be accorded immunity in those situations where the law is rela-
tively noncontroversial, such as ordinary tort cases or contract claims
arising from the sale or delivery of goods.' 9 ° Likewise, routine operating
matters, such as letters of credit, oil tanker spills, and repayments of loans,
should be classified as commercial. Conversely, immunity should be ex-
tended when a foreign government's decision reflects an ideological prefer-
ence; for instance, the choice of a nationalized petroleum industry over a
private one.
D. Venue
The FSIA amends 28 U.S.C. § 1391 to establish four express provisions
for venue in civil actions against foreign states or their instrumentalities.
Suit may be brought in the judicial district where "a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred."'' This provision is
similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which allows actions against the United
States in the judicial district in which the "cause of action arose." Section
1391(f)(1), however, is not intended to imply that only one such district is
permissible in each case. Rather, in suits brought under section 1605(a)(2)
involving commercial activities abroad that cause a direct effect in the
United States, venue would exist wherever the direct effect generates a
"substantial part of the events" that give rise to the claim. 192 In cases in-
volving property or rights in property, the suit may be brought in the dis-
trict where a "substantial part of the property that is the subject of the
action is situated."'' 93 This venue provision is based on the reasoning that
no hardship would be imposed on the foreign sovereign by subjecting it to
suit where it has chosen to place the. property that gives rise to the claim.' 94
A suit in admiralty to enforce a maritime lien against a cargo or vessel of
a foreign state may be brought in the judicial district where such cargo or
vessel is located at the time notice is delivered.' 95 An action against an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign government may be brought in the
judicial district where that agency or instrumentality is doing business or
where it is licensed to do business. 96 A suit against a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof may be brought in the district court for the
District of Columbia. 9 As foreign nations have diplomatic representa-
189. 477 F. Supp. at 567.
190. Note, supra note 182, at 1254-56.
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1) (1976).
192. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 31-32, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6630-31, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1415.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1) (1976).
194. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 32, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6631, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1415.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(0(2) (1976).
196. Id. § 1391(f)(3).
197. Id. § 1391(0(4).
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tives in Washington, D.C., this should be the most convenient place for
them to defend.
Venue provisions may be waived by a foreign state; failure to object to
improper venue in a timely manner constitutes such a waiver.' 98 In addi-
tion, section 1391() does not apply to entities that are owned by a foreign
state, but which are also citizens of the United States as defined in 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(c) and (d). 9 9 Such entities are not agencies or instrumen-
talities within the scope of the Act, and thus may not insist on its venue
requirements.
E. Removalfrom State Courts
Section 1441(d) of title 28 provides for the removal to a federal district
court of suits brought in state courts against a foreign sovereign or its in-
strumentality. "In view of the potential sensitivity of actions against for-
eign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this
area, it is important to give foreign states clear authority to remove to a
Federal forum actions brought against them in the State courts.
' 200
The thirty-day time limit for removal imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
may be extended at any time for "cause shown.",2 ' This transfer right,
however, was denied in two cases that had been instituted in state courts
prior to the effective date of the FSIA.2°2 Concern was expressed that such
a retroactive application of the Act might lead to removal of all pending
cases, without regard to how far the proceeding had progressed.20 3
F. Responsive Pleadings
The foreign sovereign defendant is given sixty days from the time serv-
ice is made to file an answer or other responsive pleading. 2° This places
the foreign government on a par with the United States Government with
respect to the time to answer or reply.
20 5
If, instead of being sued, a foreign sovereign initiates or intervenes in an
action, sovereign immunity is lost for three types of claims related to the
action. First, immunity is denied concerning any counterclaim for which
198. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
199. Such an entity might include a corporation organized and incorporated under the
laws of a state. See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524, 526-29 (C.C.P.A.
1934). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 15, reprinted n [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6614, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1406.
200. Herzberger v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, S.A., 78 Civ. 2451 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
17, 1978); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 32, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 6631, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1415.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
202. Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara (Pertamina), 428 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rasu Mantima S.A. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Buma Negara, 77 Civ. 263 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
1977) (memo endorsement).
203. Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara (Pertamina), 428 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d) (1976).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
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the foreign sovereign would not be entitled to immunity under section
1605 if the counterclaim had been brought as a direct claim in a separate
action against the foreign state.2" Secondly, even if a foreign state would
otherwise be entitled to immunity under sections 1604 to 1606, it is not
immune from a counterclaim "arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign state. 2 °7 When the
foreign state brings or intervenes in an-action based on a particular trans-
action or occurrence, it should not be able to invoke the benefit of litigat-
ing before United States courts while avoiding any legal liabilities asserted
against it in those same courts, if such liability arises from the same trans-
action or occurrence.2"8 Finally, even if the foreign state is immune from a
judgment under these first two situations, it is not immune from a setoff, to
the extent the setoff does not exceed in amount or differ in kind from the
relief sought by the foreign state.2"9
The FSIA does not expressly strip the foreign state of immunity from
similar counterclaims when, as a defendant, the foreign state has asserted a
cross-claim or issued a third-party complaint. Logic and fairness, how-
ever, dictate that a sovereign defendant filing a cross-claim or a third-party
complaint should be equally subject to resulting counterclaims.210
In November 1979 Iran filed suit in a New York state court against the
deposed shah, Reza Pahlevi to recover $61 million in compensatory and
punitive damages for alleged misappropriation of funds. The complaint
charges that the Pahlavi Foundation was merely a channel for diverting
public money into private use. Having initiated this suit, the Government
of Iran has opened itself to certain counterclaims and to setoffs. The Pah-
lavi Foundation reportedly holds interests in a number of private compa-
nies, such as National Cash Register in Iran.2 ' If one of those companies
has a claim against the current government, what is the possibility of its
asserting a counterclaim in this litigation?
G. Nonjury Trials
As in suits against the United States Government,22 actions against for-
eign sovereigns or their instrumentalities were intended by the drafters of
the FSIA to be nonjury trials, on the ground that actions "tried by a court
without jury will tend to promote a uniformity in decisions where foreign
governments are involved. 21 3 Section 1330(a) of title 28 specifically
grants original jurisdiction for nonjury trials only. Furthermore, section
1441(3) stipulates that upon removal from a state court, the federal court
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1976).
207. Id. § 1607(b).
208. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1976). See also National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356 (1955).
210. Brower, mupra note 74, at 209.
211. Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
213. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6611-12, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 1405.
1979] 1037
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
shall try the case "without a jury." Nevertheless, the court held in Icenogle
v. Olympic Airways, SA.214 that the right to a jury trial still exists in suits
against corporations owned by foreign governments when the action has
been brought under section 1332(a)(2) instead of section 1330. Section
1332(a)(2) authorizes diversity jurisdiction in suits between citizens of a
state and "foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof." Although the
court conceded that nonjury trials were required in case of a removal from
a state court under section 1441, no such requirement applied if the suit
was initially commenced in a federal court under section 1332(a)(2).215
H. Judgments
1. Default Judgments. No default judgment may be entered against a
foreign state or its instrumentality "unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. "2' 6 This is the
same rule that applies to default judgments against the United States.217
In making the determination whether the plaintiff has proved his claim,
the court should take into account the extent to which the plaintiff's case
depends on appropriate discovery against the foreign state.2z 8 After a de-
fault judgment has been entered, the defendant must be so notified in the
manner prescribed for service.219
2. Extent of Liability. Tort liability of a foreign state or one of its politi-
cal subdivisions under the Act does not extend to punitive damages. 22 If,
however, death has occurred and the applicable law would permit the re-
covery of only damages punitive in nature, the foreign state will be liable
for actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injury re-
sulting from death to the person for whose benefit the claim is asserted.22 '
This prohibition against punitive damages does not apply, however, to
suits against agents or instrumentalities of a foreign state. 2
As discussed above, judgments enforcing maritime liens against foreign
states may not exceed the value of the vessel or cargo, with value measured
as of the date notice of suit was served.223
I. Execution of Judgments
A number of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation entered
into by the United States permit execution of judgments against foreign
214. 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979), reprinled in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 963 (1979).
215. Id. at 38, 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 967-68.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976).
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e).
218. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 26, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6625, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1412.
219. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a), (b), (c) (1976); see 22 C.F.R. § 93.2 (1979) (form for notice of
default judgment); Appendix B.
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. § 1605.
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publicly owned or controlled enterprises.22 4 The Brussels Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned
Vessels2 25 allows execution of judgments against public vessels engaged in
commercial services in the same way as against privately owned vessels.
Although the United States is not a party to this treaty, this country fol-
lows a policy of not claiming immunity for its publicly-owned merchant
vessels.2 26 The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone,227 to which the United States does belong, recognizes the lia-
bility to execution, under appropriate circumstances, of state-owned
vessels used in commercial service. Aside from these situations, however,
the United States has in the past taken the position that property of foreign
states is absolutely immune from execution.228
The FSIA substantially changes this rule. Property of a foreign state
used for a commercial activity in the United States is now subject to execu-
tion or attachment in aid of execution under the circumstances set forth in
the statute.229 The term "attachment in aid of execution" includes "attach-
ments, garnishments, and supplemental proceedings available under appli-
cable Federal or State law for satisfaction of a judgment. 23 °
In determining whether execution is permissible, one should first note
that certain types of property continue to be immune from execution.
Funds of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own
account in the United States are exempt from execution or attachment,
unless immunity has been expressly waived.231 The term "held for its own
account" refers to funds used or held in connection with central banking
activities, as distinguished from funds used solely to finance the commer-
cial transactions of other entities.232 This exemption was believed neces-
sary to avoid discouraging the deposit of foreign funds within the United
States.233 Moreover, execution against the reserves of a foreign state could
cause serious foreign relations problems.234
In addition to the above immunity, property of a foreign state is immune
from execution if the property is "of a military character" or "under the
control of a military authority or defense agency., 235 According to the
224. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, & Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United
States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
225. Apr. 10, 1926, 196 L.N.T.S. 199.
226. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 742, 747, 781 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 27,
reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6626, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1412.
227. April 29, 1958, arts. 20 & 21, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
228. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930);
Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469, 473 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1959).
229. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1976).
230. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 28, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6627, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413; see FED R. Civ. P. 69.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (1976).
232. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 31, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6630, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1414.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) (1976).
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legislative history of the FSIA, property is considered of a military charac-
ter if it consists of equipment in the broad sense: weapons, ammunition,
tanks, warships, etc.2 36 Both the character and the function of the property
must be military. Also exempt from execution is other military property,
such as food, clothing, fuel, and office equipment that, although not of a
military character, is essential to military operations.2 37 "Control" means
authority over disposition and use, in addition to physical control. These
exceptions are intended to avoid the possibility of a foreign state's recipro-
cally executing against military property of the United States abroad.238
Section 1610(a) covers execution against property of a foreign state. By
comparison, the more liberal provisions of section 1610(b) apply only to
executions of judgments against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state. Only property of a foreign state "used for" a commercial activity in
the United States is subject to execution under section 1610(a). Section
1605(a)(2), the provision that confers jurisdiction for actions based on
commercial activity,239 uses the term "in connection with" a commercial
activity. It is not clear whether these two phrases are intended to have
different meanings. The words "in connection with" appear to have a
broader reach than "used for." Thus, under the "use" test for execution,
would the property actually have to be operated here, or would a mere
passive holding of property be sufficient? The answer to this question must
be left to the courts.24 °
Once the initial hurdle of locating commercial property of the foreign
state within the United States is overcome, the plaintiff must then attempt
to fit such property into one of the five categories under which execution is
allowed. The first category permits execution if the defendant state has
explicitly or implicitly waived its immunity from execution.24' Such waiv-
ers could consist of an applicable provision in a treaty, a contractual stipu-
lation, or an official statement.242 Secondly, execution is available against
property that "is or was used" by the foreign state for a commercial activ-
ity in the United States, provided that the commercial activity gave rise to
the claim upon which the judgment is based.243 This exception also in-
cludes any commercial activity that gives rise to a maritime lien in connec-
tion with an admiralty suit brought under section 1605(b). Execution may
likewise be had against commercial property other than the vessel or cargo
that is the subject of a suit under section 1605(b) if such property is used in
236. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 31, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6630, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1415.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See text accompanying notes 53-69, 155-78 supra.
240. R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 62.
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
242. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 28, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6627, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413.
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
1040 [Vol. 33
FOREIGN SO VEREIGN IMMUNITIES A CT
the same commercial activity upon which the maritime lien was based.2"
The phrase "is or was used" in section 1610(a)(2) covers the possibility that
property may have been transferred from the commercial activity forming
the basis of the suit in an effort to avoid process of the court.24
The third category of property subject to execution is that used by a
foreign state for a commercial activity in the United States when the "exe-
cution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which has been
taken in violation of international law or which has been exchanged for
property taken in violation of international law.",246 This section may be
interpreted as applying only to claims against specific property; thus, its
usefulness may be confined to situations in which movable property has
been nationalized and thereafter has been used by the nationalizing state
for a commercial purpose in the United States.
24 7
The fourth exception to immunity from execution involves a judgment
determining rights in real property located in the United States that was
acquired by gift or succession.248 Judgments establishing rights in such
property may be executed if the property is used by the foreign state in a
commercial activity. Embassies and related buildings are not deemed
property used for a commercial activity.249 Diplomatic and consular mis-
sions, as well as the residences of chiefs of such missions, are also not sub-
ject to execution.25° Finally, execution may be had against proceeds of a
liability insurance policy owned by the foreign state. 251' After judgment,
such obligations are treated as property of the foreign state subject to gar-
nishment or related procedures in accordance with the applicable state or
federal law. This exception to immunity was intended to facilitate recov-
ery by individuals injured in accidents involving vehicles owned by a for-
252eign state.
The broader provisions of section 1610(b) apply only to a judgment ren-
dered against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. In this situa-
tion execution is permitted if the agency or instrumentality has waived its
immunity or if the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or
instrumentality is not immune under sections 1605(a)(2), (a)(3), or (a)(5),
or section 1605(b).253 Under this subsection execution against an agency
or instrumentality does not require that the attached property be commer-
cially used. Moreover, no nexus is needed between the claim upon which
the judgment is rendered and the property against which execution is
244. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 28, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6627, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413.
245. Id.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(3) (1976).
247. R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 63-64.
248. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(A) (1976).
249. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 29, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6628, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413.
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (1976).
251. Id. § 1610(a)(5).
252. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 29, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6628, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1976).
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sought.254 Section 1610(b), however, will not permit execution against the
property of one agency or instrumentality to satisfy a judgment against
another agency or instrumentality. 25 5 Congress reasoned that the failure
of United States law to respect the separate juridical identities of different
agencies or instrumentalities might encourage foreign nations to disregard
the juridical divisions between different United States corporations or be-
tween a United States corporation and its independent subsidiary.256
J. Pre-Judgment Attachments For Security Purposes
The question of pre-judgment attachments for purposes other than ac-
quiring jurisdiction is not directly addressed in the FSIA. Under sections
1609 and 1610, the property of a foreign state is immune from attachment
or arrest except for certain commercial property subject to "attachment in
aid of execution." The House Report states that the term "in aid of execu-
tion" refers to measures necessary to "obtain satisfaction of a judg-
ment." '257 Section 1610(a) provides that no attachment shall be permitted
until "after . . . a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the en-
try ofjudgment." Both the language and the legislative history of the Act
seem to indicate that, as a general rule, foreign sovereigns should be im-
mune from pre-judgment attachments. In Behring International, Inc. v. Im-
perial Iranian Air Force the court concluded that section 1610(b) did not
waive the defendant's immunity from pre-judgment attachment.25
Pre-judgment attachments are, however, permitted under section
1610(d) if two conditions can be satisfied: (1) the foreign state must have
explicitly waived such immunity, and (2) the purpose of the attachment
must be to secure payment of a judgment that may be rendered. In the
Behring case the issue was whether the Treaty of Amity with Iran consti-
tuted such a waiver. Article XI, paragraph 4 of that Treaty provides: "No
enterprise of either High Contracting Party. . . shall, if it engages in com-
mercial activities within the territories of the other, . . . claim or enjoy
. . . immunity. . . from. . . suit, execution of judgment or other liability
.. "259 The court decided that this language was not an explicit waiver
within the meaning of section 1610(d). Nevertheless, the Behring court
concluded that the defendant had waived its immunity from pre-judgment
attachment. The FSIA does not abrogate any preexisting treaties, as indi-
cated, for example, by the language in section 1609: "Subject to existing
international agreements." Thus, the court reasoned that the Treaty of
Amity stands on its own, independent of the FSIA; consequently, the sec-
254. Id. § 1610(b)(2).
255. See Prelude Corp. v. Owners of F/V Atlantik, A.M.C. 2651 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
256. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 29-30, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6628-29, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1414.
257. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 28, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6627, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413 (emphasis added).
258. Opinion Maintaining Restraints, Civ. No. 79-675 (D.N.J., filed July 24, 1979), re-
printed in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1370 (1979), and Opinion Authorizing Writ of Attach-
ment (D.N.J., filed Aug. 13, 1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1389 (1979).
259. 8 U.S.T. 901, T.I.A.S. No. 3888 (1955). (emphasis added).
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tion 1610(d) requirement of an explicit waiver did not apply to the Treaty.
Since the words "execution of judgment" preceded the term "or other lia-
bility" in the Treaty, the latter was construed as referring to situations
other than attachment after judgment. Thus, pre-judgment attachments
were considered authorized.2r° This decision is now on appeal.26'
In Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co. 262 the court stated
that whenever the purpose of an attachment is not to obtain jurisdiction,
but rather to secure assets, a different analysis should apply. "It is a harsh
remedy which should be construed strictly against those seeking to use
it," '63 and should be granted "only upon a showing that drastic action is
required for security purposes., 2 64 The court refused to issue the attach-
ment in this case because the possibility of the defendant removing its
more than $700 million on deposit in the United States "is simply too re-
mote., 265 Although the request was dismissed on this ground, the court
went on to criticize the Behring decision. In the "interest of consistent pol-
icy," a waiver of immunity from pre-judgment attachments "should be ex-
plicit whether it be by statute or by international agreement.,
2 66
"Apparently Congress recognized that pre-judgment attachments are po-
tentially more harassing than post-judgment attachments and therefore, a
waiver of immunity . . . should not be lightly applied., 2 66a Since it was
the friction created by jurisdictional attachments that prompted Congress
to eliminate them in the FSIA, the position taken by the Reading court
seems more consistent with the policy underlying the FSIA.
K. Injunctions
Fearing that no assets might remain in the United States against which a
judgment could be executed, the plaintiff in Electronic Data Systems 267
sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from removing
or transferring funds belonging to the Government of Iran from the
Marine Midland Bank in New York City. Finding a distinction between
an attachment and an injunction, the trial court issued the preliminary in-
junction on the ground that the legislative history of section 1606 indicates
an injunction may be granted in cases where "clearly appropriate. "268 The
260. Opinion Maintaining Restraints, Civ. No. 79-675 (D.N.J., filed July 24, 1979), re-
printed in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1370 (1979).
261. Id., 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1369.
262. 79 Civ. 4421 (KTD), (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1979), reprintedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
1398 (1979).
263. Id., 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1402.
264. Id., 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1403 (quoting Incontrade, Inc. v. Oilborn Int'l, S.A.,
407 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
265. Id., 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1405.
266. Id., 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1408.
266a. Id.
267. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (memorandum opinion granting preliminary injunction).
268. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 22, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6621, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1410.
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current political instability supported a finding that unless the injunction
were issued, there was a danger of irreparable harm to the plaintiff.
Finally, the court concluded that the funds in question were the kind of
property against which a final judgment in this case could be executed.
The Government of Iran argued that the money involved actually be-
longed to the Ministry of Defense of Iran and thus was exempt from exe-
cution under section 1611(b)(2)(B). The House Report stated that this
provision was "intended to protect other military property, such as food,
clothing, fuel and office equipment .... ,,269 This enumeration of specific
items led the court to conclude that this exception was intended to apply
only to tangible goods and not to money. Yet no such limitation on the
word "property" appears in the statute. One dictionary defines "property"
as "everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal,
tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that
has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate."270
Certainly cash and bank accounts should qualify as "property" under this
definition.
Nevertheless, under the principle of statutory construction, "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius," the express statutory mention of certain things
impliedly excludes others not mentioned. 271 Although this maxim is con-
sidered a useful guide in determining legislative intent in some situations,
in other cases it serves no purpose, especially if the legislative aim appears
to be to the contrary.272 The enumeration involved here is not even con-
tained in the statute, but rather in the House Report. Moreover, the Re-
port explains that section 1611 (b)(2)(B) is meant to cover property which,
"although not a military character is essential to military operations. "273
Certainly, money is necessry for military activities. Since the purpose of
this subparagraph is to prevent retaliatory execution against property of
the American military abroad, it would seem equally important to protect
the funds needed to equip and supply our armed forces. Thus, the court's
ruling that section 1611 (b)(2)(B) applies only to tangible property seems
unwarranted.
As indicated above, the property of one agency or instrumentality may
not be used to satisfy a judgment against another.274 Since the Ministry of
Defense was not a party to this suit, it was argued that these funds were
immune from attachment or execution. This money had originally been
deposited in the Bank Sepah in an account held by the Iranian Air Force
and Navy. Subsequently, the funds were transferred to the Marine Mid-
land Bank in the name of the Government of Iran. Stating that this prop-
269. Id. at 31, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6630, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at
1414.
270. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (quoting Samet v. Farmers' &
Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 247 F. 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1917)).
271. E.g., Bloemer v. Turner, 281 Ky. 832, 137 S.W.2d 387 (1939).
272. E.g., Collins v. Russell, 114 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1940).
273. H.R. REP. No. 94-1478, supra note 38, at 31, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6630, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1414.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1976).
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erty was "under the control" of the state of Iran, rather than the military
authorities,2 75 the court referred to the statement in the House Report that
the courts would determine "whether property held by one agency should
be deemed to be property of another" and "whether property held by an
agency is property of the foreign state. 276
Although action may well lie against the Social Security Organization
and Ministry of Health and Welfare in this case, the possibility still exists
that the suit against the Government of Iran may be barred on the ground
that any interference by it with contractual rights falls within section
1605(a)(5)(B).277 If this occurs, the prohibition against using the property
of one agency to satisfy a judgment against another would seem to pre-
clude execution against these funds, whether they belong to the Govern-
ment of Iran or to the Ministry of Defense, to satisfy any judgment against
the Social Security Organization or the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
Finally, the court reasoned that this property was available for execution
under section 1610(a)(1) since Iran had waived its immunity in the Treaty
of Amity.2 78 This subparagraph, however, does not apply unless the for-
eign state's property is also being "used for a commercial activity in the
United States. '2 79 There was no indication in this opinion that these funds
were being used for a commercial activity in the United States; without
such a finding, the property should be immune from execution.
Laying aside these technical objections, the more basic issue in Elec-
tronic Data Systems is whether a federal court in Texas may enjoin a for-
eign sovereign from transferring assets located in New York when no final
judgment has yet been rendered. Certainly the threatened harm must ap-
pear grave to a plaintiff who has reason to believe a foreign government
may remove its property from the United States before any judgment can
be secured. It has long been established that once personal jurisdiction is
secured, a court may use its equity power to order a defendant to perform
certain actions in reference to property in another state.28° When the de-
fendant is personally before the court, such a decree can be enforced in
personam through the process of contempt.28' If, however, the res is
outside the court's power, a decree involving property located in another
jurisdiction need not be recognized by the courts in the situs state.282
Whether the injunction in this case legally affects the funds in New York
is open to question. First, no service had been made on the Government
of Iran at the time the injunction was issued, although counsel for the de-
275. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F, at
14-15 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (memorandum opinion granting preliminary injunction).
276. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 28, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6627, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413.
277. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
278. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
279. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1976).
280. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Vesey Senior 444 (Ch. 1750), reprinted in Z. CHAFEE & E.
RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 68 (5th ed. 1967).
281. Id.
282. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
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fendant had participated in the proceedings.28 3 Secondly, it is not clear
how the issuing court's order could be enforced in a contempt proceeding.
Imprisoning a foreign official or diplomat is not permissible for those na-
tions that abide by "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."'284 A fine for violating the injunction may also be unenforce-
able.285 Finally, this decree did not try to affect the funds directly; rather it
was aimed at the defendant. Such an injunction may be worthless against
a foreign sovereign that chooses to remove assets anyway, unless the sec-
ond American state is willing to recognize the decree on some theory of
comity.
286
The very attractiveness and flexibility of this particular remedy may call
for judicial self-restraint, especially if an injunction is to be issued against
a foreign sovereign. As one judge has said, "I have always felt . . . that
extreme danger attends the exercise of this part of the jurisdiction of the
court, and that it is a jurisdiction which is to be exercised with extreme
caution ... .2
One should also inquire whether issuing a preliminary injunction is con-
sistent with the public policy underlying the FSIA. In the analysis of sec-
tion 1606 on "Extent of Liability," the House Report states that a court
may, in appropriate circumstances, "order an injunction or specific per-
formance."2 8 The statute itself refers to punitive damages and compensa-
tory damages; injunctions and specific performance are added as forms of
relief in the House Report. All these are remedies which imply that liabil-
ity has already been established. Only after such a determination can the
appropriate remedy be selected. Since this paragraph in the House Report
seems concerned with the nature of relief a final judgment should provide,
it would seem preferrable to interpret the word "injunction" in this context
as referring to injunctive relief given as part of a final judgment. Prelimi-
nary injunctions would not be included under this interpretation.28 9
Moreover, the reason for eliminating attachments as a means of securing
jurisdiction was to avoid friction with foreign governments. If American
courts can now use injunctions to restrict a foreign sovereign's disposition
283. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA-3-79-218-F
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979) (memorandum opinion granting preliminary injunction).
284. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.1(c), T.S. 993; see Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 24; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(entered into force for the United States Dec. 24, 1969), 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
285. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 22, reprinted in[ 1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6621, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls at 1410.
286. See McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961) (foreign decree
recognized on basis of comity making consideration of the full faith and credit clause unnec-
cessary).
287. Cottenham, C. in Brown v. Newall, 2 Myl. & C. 558, 570 (1837), reprinted in Z.
CHAFEE & E. RE, supra note 281, at 819.
288. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 22, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6621, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1410.
289. In International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), the court refused to issue a
preliminary injunction against defendant's price setting activities; such relief was considered
inappropriate on the basis of an incomplete record without a full hearing.
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of its own assets, a new source of irritation is spawned and a prime objec-
tive of the FSIA circumvented.
L. Impact of Foreign Assets Control Regulations on the FSIA
Any question about the validity of the injunction in Electronic Data Sys-
tems became moot when the Treasury Department froze all assets of the
Iranian Government located within the United States on November 14,
1979 by promulgating the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 290 under the
authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.29 ' Sec-
tion 535.201 of those regulations provides that no property within the
United States in which Iran "has any interest of any nature whatsoever
may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in ..
without a Treasury license.292 Thus, any judgment obtained by the Elec-
tronic Data Systems case cannot be executed against Iran's assets, and the
injunction pending in this case becomes superfluous.293
The announcement by the Iranian Foreign Minister that his nation
would not pay foreign debts of the former regime triggered efforts by a
number of American banks to attach Iranian assets.294 On November 23,
290. 31 C.F.R. pt. 535, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979).
291. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. 1 1977). Previously, the basic statutory authority for
the foreign assets control regulations was the Trading With the Enemy Act ch. 106, § 5(b),
40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917).
292. 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1979).
293. Interview of Nov. 26,1979, with Dennis M. O'Connell, Acting Chief Counsel, Office
of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of Treasury.
294. Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1979, at 6, col. 1. In addition, Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany of New York obtained an order from a court in Essen, West Germany, permitting the
bank to attach Iran's 25% interest in Fried Krupp G.m.b.H., as well as Iran's 25% interest in
Deutsch Babcock, A.G., a machinery manufacturer. The value of the Krupp interest at-
tached is about $100 million. Morgan has sought this attachment in connection with a de-
fault upon a $40 million loan made as part of a $500 million credit package assembled by a
syndicate of eleven banks. The holdings of Iran in these West German companies could be
used to satisfy this debt. Morgan's actions reportedly caused grave concern among West
German bankers and businessmen who fear they will be dragged into the United States-
Iranian conflict. Id., Nov. 29, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
Moreover, at the request of Chemical Bank of New York, a court in the United Kingdom
has enjoined the Government of Iran, the Bank Markazi Iran, and the Iranian Central Bank
from removing any assets from Great Britain. Chemical Bank sought this injunction on the
ground that the Iranian Government had defaulted on a $50 million loan that formed part
of a $500 million syndicated credit. Reportedly, the injunction will be lifted if the Iranian
Government or Bank Markazi posts $51 million in security or in an acceptable bond. 1d.,
Dec. 6, 1979, at 2, col. 2; see Delaume, The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom, 73
AM. J. INT'L L. 185 (1979). Previously, Bank Markasi had asked the British court to order
the London branches of five American banks to repay deposits blocked by the United States
regulations. These suits asked for payment of $1.8 billion by the Bank of America in San
Francisco, $415 million by Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. of New York, $332 million by
Bankers Trust Co. of New York, $321 million by Chase Manhattan Bank, and $175 million
by Citibank of New York.
Bank Markasi also filed suit in a Paris court against Citibank for its refusal to return a $50
million deposit placed in Citibank's French affiliate. French authorities have made it clear
that any dispute concerning such funds will be governed by French law. Wall St. J., Dec. 6,
1979, at 2, col. 2. Should Citibank be ordered by the Paris court to return the funds, the
Bank may have one obligation under French law and a conflicting duty under United States
law. The Iranian Assets Control Regulations apply to any property "in the possession of or
10471979]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the Treasury Department added section 535.504 to the Iranian Foreign As-
sets Control Regulations. This provision permits judicial proceedings to
be instituted with respect to the frozen property,295 but does not authorize
"the entry of judgment" or execution of judgment against such blocked
assets. 296 Hence, any judgments which may be secured will give no rights
in the blocked assets until, and if, they are unfrozen.2 97 Pursuant to this
revised Treasury regulation, a federal court in Milwaukee on November
30 responded to a plea of the First Wisconsin Bank by ordering the attach-
ment of certain deposits belonging to the Iranian government.298 The
FSIA, however, was not raised as an issue during the hearing on this mat-
ter,299 and this attachment may well contravene the Act.
In E-Systems v. Islamic Republic of Iran3" the plaintiff has requested
foreclosure against two Boeing 707's to satisfy a $7.7 million lien for labor
and materials provided while working on these planes. Since the aircraft
are still in possession of E-Systems, the Iranian Assets Control Regulations
would appear to cover this situation as well. Section 535.201 prohibits
transfer of Iranian government property "in the possession or control of
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" without a Treasury
license. "Property" is defined by the regulations to include "goods" and
control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 31 C.F.R. § 535.201
(1979). In FruehaufCorp. Y. Massardy, Fruehauf-France, S.A., which was two-thirds owned
by an American corporation, had made a contract to deliver sixty vans to Automobiles Ber-
liet for eventual delivery to the Peoples' Republic of China. [1965] Gazette du Palais II, Jur.
86, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147. The United States Treasury Department issued an order to the
American parent to cause Fruehauf-France, S,A., to suspend execution of this contract as a
violation of the United States Foreign Asset Control Regulations prohibiting trade with
Communist China. The minority directors of Fruehauf then sued the American directors of
Fruehauf-France and the American parent coporation in a French court. Holding the con-
tract valid, the French court appointed an administrator for Fruehauf-France for three
months to execute the contract. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Paris
in 1965. Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy, [1965] Gazette du Palais II, Jur. 86, [1968] D.S. Jur.
147, reprintedin H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS
AND TEXT 1225 (2d ed. 1976).
The Treasury Department had based jurisdiction in the Fruehaufcase upon § 500.329 of
the Foreign Asset Control Regulations, which provides that the term "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" includes "(3) any corporation organized under the laws of
the United States or of any State." The same language appears in the Iranian regulations.
31 C.F.R. § 535.329 (1979). In the Fruehauf case, the United States Treasury ultimately
ruled that the American parent could not control the situation because of the appointment of
the French administrator. The trailers were delivered, the regular manager reinstated, and
relations with the Berliet company restored. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra, at 1226. Ad-
ministration of the foreign asset controls is subject to political considerations. For examples
where such factors have determined whether a special license would be issued, see id at
1223.
295. 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 67,617 (1979).
296. Id. §§ 535.504(b)(1) & (2).
297. See also Wall. St. J., Nov. 27, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
298. Id., Dec. 3, 1979, at 2, cols. 3 & 4.
299. Interview of Dec. 4, 1979, with Judy Spangler, law clerk to Judge John W. Rey-
nolds, United States District Court of Wisconsin.
300. No. CA-3-79-1487 (N.D. Tex., complaint filed Dec. 5, 1979). In addition, the plain-
tiff sought the termination of a guaranty issued by Bank Melli in favor of the Imperial
Iranian Government, Ministry of War, as well as the cancellation of performance letters of
credit issued by the Bank of America in favor of Bank Melli.
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"chattels," as well as "liens." '' Thus, it would appear that the district
court may not at this time foreclose the liens against these planes.
Even after the Iranian assets are unblocked, these various plaintiffs may
not recoup the entire amount of their claims. In blocking assets of a for-
eign government, the United States has several objectives. First, the target
state is deprived of the use of the property. Secondly, the United States
acquires an economic weapon helpful in future bargaining with that coun-
try. Finally, freezing assets ensures preservation of resources from which
private American claims against that nation may eventually be paid. In
addition to Iran, blocking regulations since 1950 have been issued against
the assets of the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia,3 °2 Rhodesia,3 °3 and Cuba.3°4
Past experience indicates that blocked assets are often relinquished by
the foreign government in exchange for diplomatic recognition or some
other advantage. Such property may consequently be transferred to the
United States government for eventual distribution to private American
citizens holding claims against the foreign state.305 Since the total amount
301. 31 C.F.R. § 535.311, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979).
302. 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1978) (China and North Korea); 29 Fed. Reg. 6,025 (1964),
amending 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (North Vietnam); 40 Fed. Reg. 17,262 (1975), amending 31
C.F.R. § 500.201 (Cambodia); and 40 Fed. Reg. 19,202 (1975), amending 31 C.F.R.
§ 500.201 (1975) (South Vietnam). The freeze against Cambodia affects $10 million in as-
sets, against Vietnam $100 million, and against China $80 million. The blockade of Chinese
assets is scheduled to be lifted in January 1980. Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1979, at 29, col. 1.
303. 31 C.F.R. pt. 530 (1975). The statutory authority for the Rhodesian Sanctions Reg-
ulations was § 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1976).
Section 287c(a) provides authority for the President to implement decisions of the Security
Council of the United Nations. This authority was delegated to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury in Exec. Order 11419, 3 C.F.R. 737 (Cum. Supp. 1966-1970). These Rhodesian sanc-
tions were lifted by President Carter on Dec. 17, 1979. Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
The United Nations also lifted its trade embargo against that country in December 1979.
Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1979, at 24, col 2.
304. 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1978). The legislative authority for the Cuban regulations is
found both in the Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, § 5, 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917), and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1976). For a full discussion of all these
foreign asset controls, see Sommerfield, Treasury Regulation of Foreign Assets and Trade, in
A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 265 (W. Surrey & D.
Wallace, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 1977).
305. For example, due to hostilities in Europe, property belonging to Hungarian nation-
als and located within the United States was blocked on Apr. 10, 1940. The subsequent 1947
Peace Treaty with Hungary stipulated that such blocked property would vest in the United
States Government. Thereafter, the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1621-1644m was amended by Pub. L. No. 84-285, § 302, 69 Stat. 567, 571 (1955) in 1955
to provide that these resources would be used to compensate American citizens who had
claims against the Governments of Hungary, Bulgaria, or Romania arising out of the war,
the nationalizations, or contract rights. 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
952 (1967).
During the negotiation on the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in
1933, the Litvinov Assignment was concluded. Under this agreement all amounts owed to
the U.S.S.R. by American nationals were assigned by the Soviet Union to the United States
Government. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937). Subsequently, the United States distributed these funds to American citizens
with claims based upon nationalization of their property situated within the Soviet Union.
In 1965 Congress amended the International Claims Settlement Act to institute a claims
program to protect rights of American citizens who had suffered losses in Cuba under the
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of assets available is usually insufficient to cover all the claims, each claim-
ant receives only a pro rata share. Hence, the companies now suing Iran
may end up in a pool with other American claimants against that nation.
Rather than full satisfaction of any judgment, partial payment may be the
maximum recoverable. 306
M. Retroactivity of Statute
It is unclear to what extent the FSIA may be retroactively applied. Sec-
tion 1602 provides that the Act shall take effect ninety days after its enact-
ment date of October 21, 1976. The House Report states that this ninety-
day period is necessary to give adequate notice of the Act and its detailed
provisions to all foreign states. In response to the provisions of the Act
that changed the previous United States position concerning execution
against the property of a foreign government, the State Department issued
a Notice stating that it did "not contemplate changing this policy in the
period before January 19, 1977. "307 As already indicated, two decisions
have already declined to apply the removal provisions of the statute retro-
actively.3"8 In Martropico the court refused to apply the Act retrospec-
tively because "the very wording of section 1330(a) that the 'district courts
shall have original jurisdiction' is prospective."3 9
Nevertheless, the Yessenin-Volpin decision in 1978 indicated that the
Castro Government. 79 Stat. 988 (1965). The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission was
charged with adjudicating these individual claims before they became stale. The Commis-
sion was also to determine the total amount involved to provide a definite sum for use in any
future negotiations that might take place between the United States and Cuba. All claims
had to be filed prior to May 31, 1967. Sutton, American Claims Against Cuba, 3 INT'L LAW.
741 (1969). As of November 1979, the Commission had certified 5,900 claims, amounting to
$1.8 billion. U.S. Dep't of State, Gist, Nov. 1979. No money is yet available to pay these
awards. Presumably, any recognition of the Cuban Government by the United States will
entail a partial settlement of these claims, perhaps with utilization of the blocked Cuban
assets for this purpose.
In exchange for the unblocking of Chinese assets by the United States, China agreed to
pay the United States $80.5 million as the full and final settlement of all claims by the
United States or its citizens against China arising from nationalization after Oct. 1, 1949.
The United States Government has exclusive authority to distribute this $80.5 million.
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Settlement of Claims, arts. I, II, and IV
(May I1, 1979), reprintedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 551 (1979).
306. With such a prospect, the question arises, is it worthwhile for a plaintiff suing Iran
to proceed to judgment? No absolute answer is possible. Obtaining a final judgment would
serve to preserve evidence and testimony. On the other hand, if Congress establishes a pro-
gram under the International Claims Settlement Act (see note 305 supra), will the plaintiff
have to undergo a proceeding analogous to a trial de novo by the Claims Commission? Or
will a court judgment be recognized and enforced by that Commission without further ex-
amination?
307. U.S. Dep't of State Notice of Nov. 10, 1976, reprinted in 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 342
(1977); see note 228 supra and accompanying text.
308. Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara (Pertamina), 428 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rasu Maritima S.A. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Buma Negara, 77 Civ. 263 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
1977) (memo endorsement); see notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text.
309. 428 F. Supp. at 1037 (emphasis in original).
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statute could be applied retroactively.3 10 Retroactive application of the
legislation in that case, however, served to protect the foreign governmen-
tal entity by characterizing it as an agency or instrumentality entitled to
immunity from suit under sections 1605(a)(2) and (5)(B). 3 1' The language
of the court in Yessenin-Volpin concerning retroactivity was repeated in
several subsequent cases. For instance, the court in Upton v. Empire of
Iran 3 2 applied the Act retrospectively, concluding that the "direct effect"
test of section 1605(a)(2) had not been satisfied and therefore the foreign
state was immune from suit.
313
The greatest confusion about retroactivity of the statute arises in the
area of jurisdiction. In NationalAmerican Corp. v. Federal Republic of Ni-
geria314 the plaintiff, prior to the effective date of the Act, had attached
property belonging to the defendant. After the Act became effective, the
plaintiff was unable to correct certain defects in the previous attachment
because attachment was no longer available as a ground for jurisdiction.
In order that the plaintiff might continue his action, the court applied the
in personam provisions of the statute retroactively and stated: "It follows
that once jurisdictional attachments have been eliminated, inpersonam ju-
risdiction under the Act would be the only means of asserting jurisdiction,
regardless of whether the events underlying the suit occurred prior to the
effective date of the Act. ''31 5 Nevertheless, because this case had been liti-
gated throughout on the assumption that only quasi in rem jurisdiction
was asserted, the court limited the plaintiff's claim to the amount of the
funds attached.316
In a subsequent case, Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale
Algerienne de Navigation,3t7 the court of appeals refused to give retroac-
tive effect to the jurisdictional provisions of the Act when the defendant
attacked the validity of an attachment made prior to the effective date of
the Act. Distinguishing this situation from the one in NationalAmerican,
the court pointed out that the retroactive application of the Act in National
American had not interfered with antecedent rights.
318
Although reaching different results on the question of retroactivity, both
National American and 4moco achieve fairness in upholding the rights of
310. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 851 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 720 (1978). The court reasoned:
[A]pplying the Immunities Act to the instant case will give effect to the con-
gressional intent and will not interfere with the antecedent rights of the parties
... .Indeed, insofar as the Immunities Act alters the rights of parties, it does
so by expanding the ability of plaintiffs to obtain satisfaction of judgments
against foreign states.
Id.
311. Id. at 854.
312. 459 F. Supp. 264, 265 (D.D.C. 1978), reprintedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 103 (1979)
(airport roof in Tehran collapsed on United States citizens).
313. Id. at 266.
314. 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1407 (1978).
315. Id. at 639, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1413.
316. Id.




plaintiffs who had pursued the then legal means available for securing ju-
risdiction over a foreign sovereign before enactment of the statute. A more
difficult situation arises when suit is initiated prior to the effective date of
the Act, but no attachment is effected because the foreign sovereign had no
property within that state. In Insurance Co. of North America & Crystal
Boat Co. v. Marina Salina Cruz3 19 the plaintiff commenced an action
against the Government of Mexico before the enactment of the statute for
work done on an American-owned ship in a Mexican naval shipyard. The
ship sank near the coast of Alaska in 1974. As no property of the Mexican
Government or of its navy was located in Alaska, no attachment was ef-
fected. Should the FSIA be applied retroactively in this situation to assert
in personam jurisdiction over the foreign state? The judge in the lower
court did not decide this question, relying instead on the Alaska long-arm
statute to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant.32° Mexico, as
defendant, has appealed on the grounds that a state long-arm statute is not
applicable to a foreign government and that the long-arm provisions of the
FSIA should not be applied retroactively.32'
The United States Supreme Court, in McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co.,322 allowed the retroactive application of California's long-arm
statute on the ground that this legislation was "remedial . . .and neither
enlarged nor impaired substantive rights. '3 23 The McGee case, however,
seems distinguishable from Crystal Boat in several important respects.
First, the Supreme Court in McGee appeared to be thinking primarily in
domestic terms, as indicated by the following passage:
[E]xpanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction. . . is attribu-
table to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over
the years. . . .With this increasing nationalization of commerce has
come a great increase in the amount of business. . . across state lines.
At the same time modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
State where he engages in economic activity.
324
It is questionable whether the same justifications of ease in communication
and transportation or the increased flow of business are equally present
between a state and a foreign government, such as Alaska and Mexico.
Moreover, in McGee the collection of premiums, one of the enumerated
bases of jurisdiction, had continued after the enactment of the long-arm
statute. Thus, the set of factors in McGee is sufficiently complex so that its
upholding of retroactive application of the long-arm statute should not be
construed as controlling interpretation of the FSIA.3 25
McGee justified the retroactive application of the long-arm statute on
319. No. 79-4050 (D. Alaska, filed Aug. 4, 1976).
320. No. A76-165 (D. Alaska Aug. 11, 1977) (memorandum and order).
321. Brief for Appellee, No. 79-4050 (9th Cir., filed June 1, 1979).
322. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
323. Id. at 224.
324. Id. at 222-23.
325. Note, Retroactive Expansion of State Court Jurisdiction Over Persons, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 1105, 1117 (1963).
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the ground it was only a change in procedure, not an expansion of substan-
tive rights. This substance-procedure distinction has been criticized in re-
cent years. "Use of the substance-procedure dichotomy has not been
helpful ... *"326 The confusion produced by the substance-procedure
distinction was stressed in Nevins v. Revlon, Inc.: "Where a statute may
greatly affect the position of the parties, it will not be construed retrospec-
tively. . . . '[T]o supply a remedy where previously there was none of any
kind is to create a right of action.' "327 The court concluded that the state
long-arm statute could not be applied retroactively: "It seems to the court
that with the situation at hand we are not dealing with a procedural mat-
ter. . . . The right given under the statute is a fundamental one. It is a
substantive right. It must be and is hereby construed as operating prospec-
tively., 3 2
8
To a large extent, the FSIA might also be characterized as creating sub-
stantive or fundamental rights that greatly affect the position of the parties.
Previously, a foreign government could employ its diplomatic resources to
seek a recommendation from the State Department that the court dismiss a
particular case on the ground of sovereign immunity.329 Usually, the
courts deferred to the Department's suggestion of immunity.33° These dip-
lomatic channels have now been closed to foreign governments by the
Act's substitution of objective judicial standards to determine jurisdic-
tion."3 In addition, mechanical application of the substance-procedure
distinction to the retroactivity question fails to take into account the fact
that procedural law may induce reliance. More recent decisions have indi-
cated that long-arm statutes should not be applied retroactively against a
litigant who justifiably acted in reliance on some provision in the prior
law.33 2 As the judge in one case stated: "In order to apply the Immunities
Act retrospectively this Court would be required to assess whether such
application interfered with antecedent rights and, if so, whether such inter-
ference was 'the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the
manifest intention of the legislature.' )333
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, foreign sovereigns that had assets
located within a state of the United States had reason to know they might
be subjected to suit in that state, but they had no reason to expect they
might be called on to defend an action in a state where they had no prop-
erty. Had this possibility been known, they might have refrained from the
326. Id. at 1119.
327. 23 Conn. Supp. 314, 182 A.2d 634, 636 (Super. Ct. 1962) (testing retroactive applica-
tion of Connecticut long-arm statute).
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
330. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Exparte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943).
331. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6605-06, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1401-02.
332. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank,
285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
333. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 459 F.
Supp. 1242, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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conduct or transaction that gave rise to the claim. One commentator sum-
marizes the possible injustice of retroactive application of a long-arm stat-
ute:
as the relationship between defendants and the state becomes more
attenuated, thereby reducing the state's need to protect its citizens,
and as the likelihood of the defendants' reliance on the prior lack of
jurisdiction increases, situations may arise in which exercise of juris-
diction so opposes "traditional notions of fair play" that due process is
violated.334
N. Interrelation with Act of State Doctrine
The House Report on the FSIA acknowledged that once the defense of
sovereign immunity is removed, the act of state doctrine may be improp-
erly asserted in an effort to block litigation.335 Under the act of state doc-
trine, American courts may refuse to adjudicate the validity of a purely
public act of a foreign sovereign committed and effected within its own
territory.336 In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba33 7 the
Supreme Court held that the "concept of act of state should not be ex-
tended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation. 338
Congress thus decided it was unnecessary to address the act of state doc-
trine in the FSIA legislation since our courts "already have considerable
guidance enabling them to reject improper assertions of the act of state
doctrine. '339 Therefore, the act of state doctrine should not apply to cases
in which a commercial activity involves significant jurisdictional contacts
with the United States.34° Following this reasoning, the court in National
American34' refused to apply the act of state doctrine to bar plaintiffs suit
under the FSIA.
IV. USE OF WAIVERS IN TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS
The foregoing survey of case law under the FSIA reveals some diver-
gency in positions taken by lower federal courts.3 42 In view of these differ-
ences, an attorney involved in a transaction with a foreign government
may be well advised to include a favorable venue selection clause in the
334. Note, supra note 325, at 1123.
335. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 20 n.l, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6618-19, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1408.
336. Id.
337. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
338. Id. at 695.
339. See note 335 supra.
340. Id.
341. National Am. Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1407 (1978).
342. Compare Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), with Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977)
(socialist state enterprise as agency or instrumentality or not); compare Gittler v. German
Information Center, 95 Misc. 2d 788, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1978),
with United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (cultural programs as public activity or commercial activity).
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agreement. Although the Act does not contain any provision on venue
waiver, the House Report states that "venue in any court could be waived
by a foreign state." '343 In addition, under the FSIA a number of other
contractual waivers would be recognized and could be valuable in enforc-
ing rights against a foreign state or its instrumentality. Examples include
an explicit waiver of immunity with respect to jurisdiction of United States
courts, an express waiver to attachment in aid of execution, and a waiver
to immunity from execution itself. Of special importance in light of the
Electronic Data Systems case would be an explicit waiver of immunity
from attachment prior to judgment in accord with section 16 10(d). These
waivers may be accompanied by an express submission to the jurisdiction
of certain courts in the United States and to an agreed procedure for serv-
ice of process. Following is such a draft waiver clause:344
Any legal action or proceedings with respect to this Agreement may
be brought in the United States District Court for the - Dis-
trict of [state] , and by execution and delivery of this Agreement,
the [foreign state or entity] hereby accepts, for itself and in re-
spect of its property, generally and unconditionally the nonexclusive
jurisdiction of such court and hereby waives any objection that it may
now or hereafter have to the laying of venue of such actions or pro-
ceedings in such court. The [foreign state or entity] hereby
designates, appoints and empowers the Consul of the [reign state
or entity] from time to time in [city] to receive, for and on behalf
of the [foreign state or entity] , service of process in such action or
proceedings commenced by [the contracting party] in the United
States District Court for the - District of [state] (which
service shall be deemed completed and effective as from ten days after
delivery thereof to said person). It is understood that a copy of such
process served on such person will be promptly forwarded by airmail
by [the contracting party] to the [foreign state or entity] at its
address appearing in section _ , but the failure of the addressee
to receive such copy shall not affect in any way the service of such
process on the said person (as the agent of the [foreign state or en-
tiLy4_). The - [foreign state or entity] further irrevocably consents
to the service of such process in such action or proceeding by the mail-
ing of copies thereof by registered or certified airmail, postage pre-
paid, to the [foreign state or entity] at its address appearing in
section _ , such service to be deemed completed and effective
as from thirty days after such mailing. Nothing contained herein shall
affect the right to serve process in any manner permitted by law or to
commence any legal action or proceeding in any other jurisdiction.
The [foreign state or entity] hereby irrevocably waives any im-
munity to which it might otherwise be entitled now or in the future in
any action or proceedings in any court of general jurisdiction, within
or outside its territory, with respect to this Agreement, from jurisdic-
tion and from the execution or enforcement of any judgment or other
343. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 32, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 663 1, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1415; see R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 55.
344. See R. von Mehren, supra note 41, at 56.
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relief obtained in such an action or proceedings, including attachment
prior to judgment for the purpose of securing satisfation of any judg-
ment that has been or may be entered against the [foreign state or
V. SOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Three years of accumulated experience under the FSIA have disclosed
some practical difficulties that may not have been anticipated by its draft-
ers. At least, no discussion of these situations was included in the House
Report.
The first problem involves a suit against a foreign sovereign when there
is clearly no jurisdiction in United States courts under the FSIA. In Aqui-
no Robles v. Mexicana de Aviacion several American citizens sued the
Mexican airline company, the national Government of Mexico, and the
Government of Mexico City in a Commonwealth court in San Juan, Pu-
erto Rico for an alleged false imprisonment in Mexico City by the Mexican
authorities.345 Such an act is clearly governmental in nature, not commer-
cial. Furthermore, having occurred outside the United States, the conduct
is also excluded from the torts covered in section 1605(a)(5). Thus, neither
under prior law nor the FSIA does an American court have jurisdiction
over this case.
The vexing question was, what recourse was open to the Mexican Gov-
ernment. Before the FSIA, the Mexican Ambassador could have re-
quested the United States State Department to interpose a defense of
sovereign immunity; there is no reason to think that the Department would
have refused in such a clearcut case. With the passage of the FSIA, how-
ever, the State Department is deprived of this authority, and the author
was informed by an attorney in the Legal Adviser's Office that the State
Department could do nothing to assist Mexico in Aquino Robles.3 46 Mex-
ico then investigated the possibility of retaining local counsel in Puerto
Rico. Fees for such American legal services were estimated at $100 per
hour or approximately $10,000 in total. Mexican officials understandly ob-
jected to spending such a sum for a case that should never have been
brought in the United States in the first place. Thus, the search began for a
less expensive way of bringing the FSIA's protective features to the atten-
tion of the court.
A Mexican lawyer in the Foreign Ministry who was familiar with the
FSIA prepared a Special Motion to Dismiss, which described the bases for
jurisdiction under section 1605 and demonstrated that none of these
grounds existed. Likewise, the motion pointed out that service had not
been effected in accord with section 1608. This attorney and the Mexican
345. No. 77-50 (Tribunal Superior de Puerto Rico, Sala de San Juan, filed July 20, 1977).
346. The Department of State has stated that after the FSIA takes effect the Department
"will not make any sovereign immunity determinations," although it may "appear as amicus
curiae in cases of significant interest to the Government." E. McDOWELL, 1976 DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 325
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Consul in San Juan then met with the judge outside the courtroom and
presented the motion. Subsequently, the case was dismissed.
347
How should similar cases coming before other federal courts be han-
dled? When an activity of a foreign sovereign arguably falls within the
section 1605 jurisdictional provisions, requiring that government to em-
ploy a local lawyer to defend seems reasonable. If, however, the conduct
involved is clearly outside the court's jurisdiction, then compelling a sover-
eign defendant to retain American counsel imposes an unjustified burden
on foreign nations, especially those third world countries whose financial
resources are limited.
If the foreign sovereign enters no appearance, a federal court must, on
its own motion if necessary, determine in every case whether jurisdiction
exists.348 Moreover, section 1608(e) of the FSIA provides that no default
judgment may be rendered unless the claimant has established "his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." In International
Association of Machinists v. OPEC3 49 neither OPEC nor its member na-
tions chose to appear. Convinced that the plaintiff had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it was entitled to relief, the court con-
cluded that under section 1608(e) no default judgment could be entered. 350
Under a different set of facts a court could also decide on its own that the
activity for which a foreign sovereign is being sued does not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1605; accordingly, the complaint
could be dismissed without appearance.
Although a judge may take judicial notice of the FSIA, ordinarily
judges rely on opposing counsel to bring to their attention the appropriate
sources of the law. 351' The problem faced by the foreign government not
wishing to retain American counsel is how to bring the pertinent provi-
sions of the FSIA to the attention of the court. The Aquino Robles case
suggests a way to resolve this difficulty. Any person duly authorized by the
foreign ministry of the defendant nation or by its embassy in Washington,
D.C. should be allowed to appear on behalf of that government concerning
certain preliminary questions, such as adequacy of the service under sec-
tion 1608 and bases for jurisdiction under section 1605. Such a person
may or may not be a lawyer either here or abroad; this should be a matter
of discretion for the foreign government. The agent appearing for the for-
eign government should submit evidence of his authority to act, signed by
either the Ambassador to the United States or the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs.352
347. Interview of Oct. 5, 1979, with Ricardo Abarca Landero, Chief of the Division of
Foreign Litigation, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Mexico. Aquino Robles v. Mexicana de
Aviacion, No. 77-5036 (802) (Tribunal Superior de Puerto Rico, Sala de San Juan, filed Oct.
16, 1978) (motion for reconsideration filed Aug. 28, 1979).
348. Warner v. Hawaii, 206 F.2d 851, 852 (9th Cir. 1953).
349. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
350. Id. at 574.
351. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 335, at 776 (2d ed. 1972).
352. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354 n.7 (2d Cir. 1964).
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A second issue is whether the procedure as outlined above would con-
form to the rules of the federal courts. Section 1654 of Title 28 of the
United States Code provides that "parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respec-
tively, is permitted . . . ." If the representative of the sovereign defendant
is a lawyer in another nation, does he qualify as counsel under this section?
A survey of the rules of a few of the principal courts reveals that, as a
general rule, out-of-state counsel may appear pro hac vice for a specific
case; usually a local attorney of record is also required. In every jurisdic-
tion examined, however, this privilege is accorded only to lawyers admit-
ted to a bar within the United States.353 Thus, it seems unlikely that an
attorney from another nation could appear pro hac vice, even on behalf of
his own government.
Alternatively, this suggested approach might be justified under section
1654 on the theory that the foreign government is conducting its case "per-
sonally," and that since a government is not a physical being, it can speak
only through a designated representative. There are cases holding that pri-
vate corporations,3 54 the United States Government,355 and a municipal
corporation 356 cannot be represented pro se. These decisions, however,
seem to predicated on the need to protect the legal entity involved against
loss or damage from incompetent representation by laymen. In contrast, it
would seem officious to force such protection on a foreign sovereign that
has deliberately elected to appearpro se through its own authorized agent.
Federal Judge Herbert Will recently accused a leading Washington,
D.C. law firm of "errant conduct" and "scavenging" in asking for a
twenty-five percent fee for the routine filing of a claim form.357 To ensure
that foreign governments are not forced to pay such unnecessary fees for
American legal services in routine matters such as the Aquino Robles case,
our courts should be liberal in allowing a foreign sovereign to appearpro
se, at least on the threshhold issues of jurisdiction and service.
In addition, under the FSIA a danger exists that jurisdictional concepts
developed for private United States' citizens and corporations may be
mechanically applied to foreign sovereigns. The House Report on the
FSIA358 refers to International Shoe359 as establishing the test against
which jurisdiction may be measured. This case, however, has produced a
multitude of progeny, some of whose notions of jurisdiction seem quite
353. Federal Local Court Rules; see, e.g., S.D.N.Y.R. 4; S.D. CAL. R. 110-3(d); D.C.R. I-
4; P.R.R. 4-C.
354. Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1976); Globe Leasing, Inc. v. Engine Supply
and Machine Service, 437 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969 no writ).
See also Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Dennett v. First
Continental Inv. Corp., 559 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
355. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
356. Niklaus v. Abel Constr. Co., 164 Neb. 842, 83 N.W.2d 904 (1957).
357. NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 1979, at 10, col. 4.
358. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6612, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1405.
359. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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strange to jurists in other nations. A number of scholars have commented
on this problem. Hay and Walker write: "[W]hat may be appropriate in a
national setting may amount to the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction in
the international context."360 This same preoccupation has been mirrored
by A. Von Mehren and Trautman, who state:
[I]n establishing bases for jurisdiction in the international sense, a le-
gal system cannot confine its analysis solely to its own ideas of what is
just, appropriate, and convenient. . . . Conduct that is overly self-
regarding with respect to the taking and exercise of jurisdiction can
disturb the international order and produce political, legal, and eco-
nomic reprisals.36'
Ehrenzweig and Jayme have likewise urged American courts to "take into
account the potentially disastrous consequences for international inter-
course, which may well result from retaliation for [an] . . . unlimited...
claim to jurisdiction. 362
For a court in Oregon to assert long-arm jurisdiction over a California
corporation is somewhat different from Kansas' assumption of jurisdiction
over a company organized and operating in Thailand. When a court in
Hawaii asserted jurisdiction over a British defendant in Duple Motor Bod-
ies, Ltd v. Hollingsworth,363 Judge Ely dissented for the following reasons:
The extension of. . . [our] "long-arm" statute so that it stretches half-
way around the world to grab the alien appellant brings to mind a
caricature of Blind Justice with arms of rubber! I see such a caricature
as depicting, and the majority's opinion as constituting, an implausi-
ble denial of due process as well as an unnecessary intrusion into the
field of international relations. . . . [M]y Brothers seem to overlook
the fact that every cited case deals with suits against American corpo-
rations and that the rationales of those cases are tailored to fit the
needs of interstate commerce within this Country. . . . [T]hose cases
• . . do not, and cannot, deal with the problem of the jurisdiction of
an American state over an English corporation.364
He concluded that overly broad jurisdictional claims "in a case such as this
will necessarily have an adverse effect on our Country's international rela-
tions. 365 If this is true when a private foreign company is involved, a
fortiorari these comments also apply when jurisdiction over a foreign sov-
ereign is asserted.
Within the United States certain grounds for jurisdiction exist that often
are not acceptable in other nations. For instance, state long-arm stat-
utes366 usually list "doing business in the state" as a basis for jurisdiction.
360. Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention Between the
United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 421, 430-31 (1976).
361. A. von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (1966).
362. 2 A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1973) (footnote
omitted).
363. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
364. Id. at 236.
365. Id. at 239.
366. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980).
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Similarly, carrying on a commercial activity within the United States qual-
'ifies as a jurisdictional ground under the FSIA.3 67 In most civil law coun-
tries, jurisdiction lies where a contract is made or performed.368 In
addition, a corporation may be sued at its seat, or "siege," for any cause of
action. A seat may be loosely described as the company's headquarters or
principal place of business. Further, civil law nations generally provide
that a corporation may be sued where it has a branch or an establishment,
but usually only for claims arising out of the activity of that branch or
establishment.369
The civil law and the American approach can produce different results,
as demonstrated in Bryant v. Finnish National Airlines.370 The plaintiff,
who had been injured in an airport in France, sued the Finnish airline in
New York. The defendant was not incorporated in the United States; it
had no officers, directors, nor shareholders in the United States; and it
operated no flights in this country. The defendant did maintain a one-
and-one-half room office for publicity purposes in New York, but it sold
no tickets there. It is most unlikely that a civil law court would have found
any basis for jurisdiction in New York upon such facts. The tort occurred
in France, the defendant had no seat in New York, and the claim did not
arise out of any activity of the New York office. The American court,
however, concluded it had jurisdiction because the defendant was "doing
business"-in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute.37 To
many other countries, this result would constitute an excessive jurisdic-
tional claim.
The nations negotiating the Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
372
attempted to deal with this problem of exorbitant jurisdictional claims. In
drafting the article describing those judgments entitled to enforcement in
other member states, the framers stipulated that recognition would not be
required if the original court had based its jurisdiction on the "fact that the
defendant carried on business within the territory of the State of origin,
unless the action arises from that business . . ."" Similarly, the Draft
Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom Provid-
ing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
Matters 374 would compel recognition of each other's judgment when juris-
diction has been based on the place of a branch or establishment, but only
367. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
368. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 291 (1970).
369. Id. at 288.
370. 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d at 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
371. Id. at 432, 208 N.E.2d at 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
372. 1966, reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 636 (1966), and 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 362(1967).373. Id., Supplemental Protocol § 4.
374. Articles 10(c) and (e), Suggested Revisions of September 1978 Text of Draft U.K.-
U.S. Judgments Convention, Summary Minutes on the Meeting of the Sub-Group on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law, May 9, 1979.
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if the proceedings arose out of the business of such branch or establish-
ment.375
Within the United States, eleven states376 have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act.3 77 This law requires enforce-
ment of a foreign country's judgment when jurisdiction is predicated on
the defendant's having a business office in that nation, but only if the claim
arose "out of business done by the defendant through that office in the
foreign country. '378 Thus, the framers of treaties, as well as of our domes-
tic legislation, have concluded that jurisdiction in the international sense,
i e., jurisdiction that entitles a judgment to enforcement by other countries,
should not be based merely on the defendant's doing business within the
territory. Rather, some additional connecting factor must to be present,
such as a link between the cause of action and the business activity of the
defendant within that territory. The Finnish National Airlines approach
seems clearly rejected.
A comparable situation exists in reference to torts. Committing a tort
within the territory is a basis for jurisdiction under most state long-arm
statutes.3 79 When the act or omission to act occurs in one state and the
injury in another, our courts in purely domestic fact situations have held
that jurisdiction may lie in the state where only the injury has taken place,
even though no other contact exists between the defendant and the forum,
and the tortious act occurred elsewhere.3 80 The question arises whether
this rule should be extended to international situations. In Insurance Com-
pany of North America and Crystal Boat Co. v. Marina Salina Cruz38 l the
work on the ship was performed in Mexico while the sinking of that vessel
allegedly took place within the territorial sea of Alaska. Thus, the act or
omission to act occurred outside the United States, while the injury hap-
pened inside the United States. Similarly, the act or omission causing the
blowout of the oil well in the Campeche Bay may have occurred in Mex-
ico, while the damage to the ocean and beaches took place in Texas.
375. Id.
376. These states are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100-.180 (1972); California, CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1713-1713.8 (West Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-62-101 to 13-
62-109 (Supp. 1978); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 121-129 (1966); Maryland, MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-701 to -709 (1974); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 235, § 23A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 691.1151-.1159 (1968); New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 5301-5309 (McKinney 1978);
and Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (Supp. 1979-1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 24.200-24.255 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 6.40.010-6.40.915 (Supp. 1978).
377. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT. See also Carl, Recog-
nition of Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations-and Vice Versa, 13 Hous. L. REV.
680 (1976); Carl, Proposed Legislation.- Uniform Foreign Country Judgments Recognition Act,
40 TEX. B.J. 40 (1977).
378. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5(a)(5).
379. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1(b), § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
380. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961). Cf. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969) (The Fifth Cir-
cuit recognized the single tort theory but concluded that it did not need to rely on the theory
because the defendent in Eyerly had several contacts with the state).
381. No. 79-4050 (Alaska, filed Aug. 4, 1976).
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Should the language "occurring in the United States" in section
1605(a)(5) and "direct effect in the United States" in section 1605(a)(2) of
the FSIA be interpreted as authorizing jurisdiction in an American court
when a tortious act or omission occurs outside the United States, but the
injury takes place within the United States? The Hague Convention pro-
vides for international recognition of a judgment when jurisdiction is
based on the place where injuries to person or property occurred "if the
author of the injury or damage was present in the territory at the time
when those facts occurred. ' '38 2 The September 1978 draft of the United
States-United Kingdom judgments convention would compel recognition
of the other country's tort judgments only if the place where the judgment
was rendered was the location where both the act or omission and the in-
jury occurred;3 83 in addition, the defendant or its agent must have been
physically present in that state.384 The Uniform Foreign Money Judg-
ments Recognition Act compels enforcement of such judgments from for-
eign countries only when jurisdiction is based on a claim arising out of the
business activities of the defendant's office in the foreign nation or out of
the operation by the defendant of a motor vehicle or plane within the for-
eign state.385
Drafters of those statutes and treaties found the foregoing types of re-
strictions on national jurisdiction a sine qua non to any possible achieve-
ment of orderly enforcement of judgments abroad.386 Similarly, American
courts would be well advised in their structuring of due process guidelines
under the FSIA to respect the perspectives of other nations as to what con-
stitutes an acceptable basis for jurisdiction. Thus, even when jurisdiction
would lie within a purely domestic context, prudence may dictate refusal
to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant if such a claim
would be perceived as "excessive" in other legal systems. In this case,
"[o]nly judicial restraint will be able to offer a semblance of an interna-
tional administration of justice." '387
For some time now, the United States has objected to what it views as
exorbitant jurisdictional claims by other nations. For example, French law
permits jurisdiction over a defendant anywhere in the world, if the plainqif
happens to be a French national. 88 In various international arenas, the
United States has been urging other countries to abandon their own exces-
382. Supra note 372, art. 10(4) (emphasis added).
383. Article 10(j)(ii), Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America Providing for the Reciprocal Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, Text of September 1978.
384. Id. art. 10(j)(i); see Comment, The Effect of the Proposed U.S.-U.K. Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments Treaty on Current Recognition Practice in the
United States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119 (1979).
385. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5(a)(5) & (6).
386. See notes 372-78 supra and accompanying text.
387. A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, supra note362, at 37.
388. C. Civ. art. 14; see E.E.C., Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (as amend. 1978) arts. 3 & 4, reprinted in 18
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 21 (1979); Carl, The Common Market Judgments Convention-Its
Threat and Challenge to Americans, 8 INT'L LAW, 446 (1976).
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sive jurisdictional grounds. If United States courts now assume jurisdic-
tion over foreign sovereign defendants on such a basis, we will enter the
next round of international negotiations with hands that are less than
clean.
Finally, practical difficulties can arise under the FSIA because the De-
partment of State is unable to shield a foreign sovereign from suits even
when significant political advantages might thereby be gained. A principal
purpose of the FSIA is "to transfer the determination of sovereign immu-
nity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the
foreign political implications of immunity decisions .. ,,389 As a result,
the Department of State may now submit an amicus curiae brief, but the
ultimate decision rests with the judiciary, whose determination must be
based upon legal criteria, not diplomatic considerations.
Assume American hostages are being held by a foreign government.
While negotiating for their release, the United States Government wishes
to offer as a quid pro quo the termination of pending litigation against that
nation within this country. Under the FSIA, the executive would have no
such authority; similarly, the judiciary probably cannot dismiss the actions
if the jurisdictional criteria of the Act is satisfied.
The current dispute with Mexico over the blowout of the Ixtoc well
could be more suitably resolved through diplomatic channels. If bilateral
settlement efforts fail, the next best alternative would be resort to an im-
partial international forum, such as the World Court390 or an ad hoc
claims commission. Such bodies generally use decision-makers from neu-
tral countries. By contrast, under the FSIA Mexico now faces the prospect
of a possibly adverse judgment for hundreds of millions of dollars ren-
dered by a judge who is a citizen of both the nation and the state that claim
to have been injured by the oil slick.
Although the United States and Mexico may prefer diplomatic channels
for settlement, the FSIA apparently prevents the Department of State from
interfering with the pending cases in Houston. Mindful of "our govern-
ment's ongoing efforts to strengthen relations with our good neighbor, the
Republic of Mexico,"39 the Attorney General for the State of Texas, in
filing a $10 million suit against SEDCO and Permargo, refrained from
suing Pemex, the Mexican government-owned company.392 As to the
other claimants, the United States executive branch seems powerless to
halt or delay the proceedings and procedural technicalities may soon com-
pel even the state of Texas to join Pemex as a defendant.393
The FSIA was intended to free the Department of State from undesir-
389. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 38, at 7, reprinted in 1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 6606, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1402.
390. Statute of the International Court of Justice, T.S. 993.
391. Letter from Mark White, Attorney General of Texas, to U.S. Secretary of State,
Cyrus Vance (Oct. 11, 1979).
392. Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1979, at 16, col. 2.
393. Letter from Mark White, Attorney General of Texas, to U.S. Secretary of State,
Cyrus Vance (Oct. 11, 1979).
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able political pressures concerning routine commercial transactions; in
fact, the Act may turn out to be a straitjacket hindering the effective con-
duct of foreign affairs. This possibility raises the question of whether the
FSIA constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of the executive's foreign
affairs powers to the judicial branch. A thorough exploration of this issue
is beyond the scope of the present article, but a few lines of thought may
nevertheless be suggested for fuller treatment elsewhere.
Judicial abstention has been considered especially appropriate in the
area of foreign affairs. Lower courts have, for instance, invoked the politi-
cal question doctrine to justify abstention from deciding constitutional is-
sues arising out of the Vietnam war; several of these cases used the
doctrine to prevent the judiciary from inquiring whether the President had
exceeded his constitutional authority in engaging in a war not declared by
Congress.394 More recently, the ownership of lands disputed by foreign
nations was ruled a "political question of foreign relations, the resolution
of which is committed to the executive branch by the Constitution.- 39 5
The act of state doctrine also represents a concern by the judiciary that it
not interfere with the foreign affairs power of the President. As the
Supreme Court stated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:396
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" un-
derpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches
of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the
competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particu-
lar kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doc-
trine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the va-
lidity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this coun-
try's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations
as a whole in the international sphere .... 397
In explaining why the judiciary should frequently defer to the executive
in this field, Professor Henkin writes: "Judge-made law, the courts must
recognize, can only serve foreign policy grossly and spasmodically; their
attempts to draw lines and make exceptions must be bound in doctrine and
justified in reasoned opinions, and they cannot provide flexibility, com-
pleteness, and comprehensive coherence. 398
394. Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862, 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967);
Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); cf.
DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971) (the propriety of participation by the Con-
gress and the Executive, as well as the means by which they do it, is a political question
outside the power and competency of the judiciary), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Or-
lando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.) (the Second Circuit decided that some mutual par-
ticipation between Congress and the President was necessary, but that if there was some
mutual participation, the propriety of the means chosen by Congress to approve the actions
of the President was a political question), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
395. Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden
Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), reprinted in 17
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1190 (1978).
396. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
397. Id. at 423.
398. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 220 (1972).
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On November 30, 1979 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia ruled that no approval of the Senate or the Congress was necessary for
the President to terminate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. 399 The
appellate court stated the President must have the power "to conduct our
foreign policy in a rational and effective manner" and added, "The subtle-
ties involved in maintaining amorphous relationships are often the very
stuff of diplomacy-a field in which the President . . .has responsibility
under the Constitution."" The FSIA, by precluding the possibility of in-
tervention in suits against foreign sovereigns, can also limit the executive's
ability to conduct foreign affairs "in a rational and effective manner."
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The FSIA makes some important contributions toward the establish-
ment of an orderly procedure for resolving commercial disputes between
United States citizens and foreign sovereigns. The long-arm provisions
help clarify a situation where uncertainty previously reigned. Abolition of
in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction remove a major souce of irritation to
foreign governments. Although compliance may not always be easy, the
service provisions of the FSIA provide litigants with precise instructions
on how to proceed against a foreign sovereign. Likewise, it is helpful to
have venue requirements spelled out in the Act. Successful litigants may
now execute their judgments against certain kinds of commercial property
of the foreign government. Where this remedy is available, the plaintiff is
relieved of the onerous burden involved in trying to satisfy his judgment
either through diplomatic intervention with the foreign government by the
United States Department of State or through enforcement of his Ameri-
can judgment by a court in the other country.
Nevertheless, the FSIA is not without problems. Although the Act
would appear to shield foreign sovereigns from pre-judgment attachment,
this new protection may be severely eroded if courts too eagerly resort to
injunctions or attachments for security purposes prior to entry of final
judgment. In addition, the American judiciary would be well advised to
avoid parochialism in applying jurisdictional standards under the long-
arm provisions of the FSIA. Certain minimal contacts may be appropriate
for due process purposes when applied to an American defendant head-
quartered in a sister state; when used to secure jurisdiction over a foreign
399. See Comment, Treaty Termination by the President Without Senate or Congressional
Approval" The Case of the Taiwan Treaty, 33 Sw. L.J. 729 (1979).
400. Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 1, 1979, at 1, col. 2. On Dec. 13, 1979, the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal. The reasons for the decision varied. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Rehnquist considered the question a political one. Justice
Powell argued that there was no "controversy" since Congress had not forced a confronta-
tion by passing a resolution to block the Executive. Justice Marshall gave no reason for his
vote to dismiss. Justice Brennan stated that the President's authority is "well-established";
Justice Brennan would have ranted review of the case and then automatically upheld the
appeals court. Wermiel, Justices Order Taiwan Treaty Suit Dismissed, Wall St. J., Dec. 14,
1979, at 4, col. I. See. also Henkin, Litigating the President's Power to Terminate Treaties, 73
AM. J. INT'L L. 647 (1979).
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government on the other side of the globe, those same contacts should per-
haps be treated as insufficient to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play
and natural justice." In determining what is "fair play" or "justice" in this
transnational context, United States judges should consider not only
American notions of proper jurisdictional grounds, but also those of other
nations. There are a number of jurisdictional bases common to most coun-
tries in the world community. Grounds lacking such consensus should be
avoided whenever a domestic court assumes power to decide a dispute in-
volving an alien defendant, especially a foreign sovereign. Such contro-
versies might be dismissed on the theory that, under the due process
requirements of the International Shoe case, jurisdiction does not lie. Al-
ternatively, refusal to hear certain disputes could be predicated on the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens;4° 1 ie., even though jurisdiction may
technically exist, the United States is not a convenient place for the litiga-
tion. Although some older opinions displayed a judicial reluctance to de-
cline jurisdiction when the claimant would thereby be forced to sue in a
401foreign nation, modem American courts are dismissing cases on the
ground of forum non conveniens even when the plaintiffs only alternative
is suit in another country.4 °3 As Chief Justice Burger, in referring a con-
troversy over to the court of a foreign country, wrote in 1972:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be en-
couraged if. . . we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
401. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), established the basic policy factors to
be analyzed in applying this doctrine:
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; . . . and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There
may also be questions as to the enforcibility of the judgment if one is obtained.
• . . There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the . . . law that must govern the case, rather than
having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and
in law foreign to itself.
Id. at 508-09.
402. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 702, 25
Cal. Rep. 530 (1962); Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Gkiafis v.
Steamship Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967).
403. Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052
1976) (dismissed even though the defendant was an American); Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little
ohn, 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); Poseidon Schiffahrt Gm. B.H. v. M/S Netuno,
335 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Poutos v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 123 F. Supp. 577
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Galban Lobo Trading Co. S/A v. Diponegoro, 108 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). The judge in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. stated, "An American citizen does not have an
absolute right under all circumstances to sue in an American court." 234 F.2d at 645. In
Mohr v. Allen, 407 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) the plaintiff sought an accounting in a
federal court in New York for alleged joint ventures which took place largely in Mexico.
The judge dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens because "[tlhere can be little
doubt that this dispute, with its clear Mexican locus, complexities and contacts, should be
resolved in Mexico in the interest of fairness and justice." Id. at 488.
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courts.
4 0 4
The most troublesome aspect of the FSIA is the elimination of the exec-
utive branch in this decision-making process. In the Aquino Robles case,
the Mexican government was hailed before an American court in a situa-
tion where jurisdiction was clearly lacking.4°5 Yet the Department of State
concluded that it could not intervene under the FSIA. Without such
assistance from the executive branch, foreign sovereigns can be forced to
retain costly defense counsel even in cases in which the Act does not confer
jurisdiction on American courts. To minimize this financial burden, for-
eign sovereigns should be permitted to appear pro se in preliminary hear-
ings on the issues of jurisdiction.
Lastly, adjudication before a United States tribunal may not be the best
method of settling certain international controversies; diplomatic negotia-
tions may offer a far preferable approach. By shutting off this latter chan-
nel for dispute resolution, the FSIA has limited the President's authority
over foreign affairs. Hence, the constitutionality of the Act becomes open
to question. The need for a variety of techniques with which to respond to
a complex, interdependent global community mandates a revesting in the
Executive Branch of a least a modicum of control over litigation involving
foreign sovereigns. Accordingly, the FSIA should be amended to allow
sovereign immunity as a defense, even in commercial matters, if the Presi-
dent has determined that immunity is required in the particular case by the
foreign policy interests of the United States and if a suggestion to this ef-
fect has been filed on his behalf in that case with the court.4°6 Such execu-
tive assertion of immunity could go to either the issue of jurisdiction or of
execution.
At first impression, this proposal may sound like a call for a return to
pre-FSIA status; there would, however, be significant differences. The key
improvements made by that Act would continue to exist; for instance, the
rules on venue, service and personal jurisdiction. Moreover, section 1605
enumerates the acts that will subject a foreign sovereign to jurisdiction,
and sections 1610 and 1611 describe the type of property against which
execution may be had. Once the requirements of sections 1605 or 1610
and 1611 have been satisfied, there should arise a rebuttable presumption
that interposition of a sovereign immunity defense is not appropriate.
Only by a strong showing that United States foreign policy interests so
require should this presumption be overcome and only then should the
Executive intervene. Following this approach would preserve the advan-
tages of the existing FSIA while ensuring that the President has sufficient
flexibility to manage foreign affairs properly.
404. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
405. See text accompanying notes 345-52 supra.
406. See e.g., the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976), which prohibits courts from applying the act of state doctrine to
certain classes of cases unless the 'President determines that application of the act of state
doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States
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To define the jurisdiction of United States courts in suits against foreign
states, the circumstances in which foreign states are immune from suit
and in which execution may not be levied on their property, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States ofAmerica in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the
"Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976".
SEC. 2. (a) That chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by inserting immediately before section 1331 the following new
section:
"§ 1330. Actions against foreign states
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard
to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state
as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in per-
sonam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity
either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable inter-
national agreement.
"(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every
claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under sub-
section (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
"(c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a foreign state
does not confer personal jurisdiction with respect to any claim for relief
not arising out of any transaction or occurrence enumerated in sections
1605-1607 of this title.".
(b) By inserting in the chapter analysis of that chapter before-
"1331. Federal question; amount in controversy; costs."
the following new item:
"1330. Action against foreign states.".
SEC. 3. That section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
striking subsections (a)(2) and (3) and substituting in their place the fol-
lowing:
"(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
"(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of
a foreign state are additional parties; and
"(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.".
SEC. 4. (a) That title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after chapter 95 the following new chapter:
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"Chapter 97.-JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN
STATES
"Sec.
"1602. Findings and declaration of purpose.
"1603. Definitions.
"1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction.
"1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state.
"1606. Extent of liability.
"1607. Counterclaims.
"1608. Service; time to answer default.
"1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a foreign
state.
"1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution.
"1611. Certain types of property immune from execution.
"§ 1602. Findings and declaration of purpose
"The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of
the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such
courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of
both foreign states and litigants in United States courts. Under interna-
tional law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial
property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered
against them in connection with their commercial activities. Claims of for-
eign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth
in this chapter.
"§ 1603. Definitions
"For purposes of this chapter-
"(a) A 'foreign state', except as used in section 1608 of this title, in-
cludes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
"(b) An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means any en-
tity-
"(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
"(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
"(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the
laws of any third country.
"(c) The 'United States' includes all territory and waters, continental
or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
"(d) A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The com-
mercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose.
"(e) A 'commercial activity carried on in the United States by a for-
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eign state' means commercial activity carried on by such state and hav-
ing substantial contact with the United States.
"§ 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
"Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
"§ 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state
"(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case-
"(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explic-
itly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with
the terms of the waiver;
"(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States;
"(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that prop-
erty or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated
by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States;
"(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by
succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United
States are in issue; or
"(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the UniteT States
and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any
official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of
his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to-
"(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused, or
"(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights.
"(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is
brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign
state, which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity of the for-
eign state: Provided, That-
"(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy of the summons
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and of the complaint to the person, or his agent, having possession of the
vessel or cargo against which the maritime lien is asserted; but such no-
tice shall not be deemed to have been delivered, nor may it thereafter be
delivered, if the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to process obtained
on behalf of the party bringing the suit-unless the party was unaware
that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, in which event
the service of process of arrest shall be deemed to constitute valid deliv-
ery of such notice; and
"(2) notice to the foreign state of the commencement of suit as pro-
vided in section 1608 of this title is initiated within ten days either of the
delivery of notice as provided in subsection (b)(1) of this section or, in
the case of a party who was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign
state was involved, of the date such party determined the existence of
the foreign state's interest.
Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b)(1) of this section, the
maritime lien shall thereafter be deemed to be an in personam claim
against the foreign state which at that time owns the vessel or cargo in-
volved: Provided, That a court may not award judgment against the for-
eign state in an amount greater than the value of the vessel or cargo upon
which the maritime lien arose, such value to be determined as of the time
notice is served under subsection (b)(1) of this section.
"§ 1606. Extent of liability
"As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not
entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign
state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except for an
agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages;
if, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place
where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been construed to
provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be
liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary in-
juries resulting from such death which were incurred by the persons for
whose benefit the action was brought.
"§ 1607. Counterclaims
"In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state
intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state
shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim-
"(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity
under section 1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a
separate action against the foreign state; or
"(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the claim of the foreign state; or
"(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceed-
ing in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.
"§ 1608. Service; time to answer, default
"(a) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be
made upon a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state:
"(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accord-
1979] 1071
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and
the foreign state or political subdivision; or
"(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international
convention on service of judicial documents; or
"(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by send-
ing a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together
with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state,
by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dis-
patched by the clerk o the court to the head of theministry of foreign
affairs of the foreign state concerned, or
"(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph (3),
by sending two copies of the summons and complaint and a notice of
suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the
foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be ad-
dressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State
in Washington, District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of
Special Consular Services-and the Secretary shall transmit one copy of
the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall
send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note
indicating when the papers were transmitted.
As used in this subsection, a 'notice of suit' shall mean a notice addressed
to a foreign state and in a form prescribed by the Secretary of State by
regulation.
"(b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be
made upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state:
"(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accord-
ance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and
the agency or instrumentality; or
"(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint either to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process in the United States; or in accordance with an
applicable international convention on service of judicial documents; or
"(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), and if
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint, together with a translation of each into the
official language of the foreign state-
"(A) as directed by an authority of the foreign state or political
subdivision in response to a letter rogatory or request or
"(B) by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be ad-
dressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the agency or in-
strumentality to be served, or
"(C) as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of
the place where service is to be made.
"(c) Service shall be deemed to have been made-
"(1) in the case of service under subsection (a)(4), as of the date of
transmittal indicated in the certified copy of the diplomatic note; and
"(2) in any other case under this section, as of the date of receipt
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indicated in the certification, signed and returned postal receipt, or other
proof of service applicable to the method of service employed.
"(d) In any action brought in a court of the United States or of a State,
a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state shall serve an answer or other responsive pleading
to the complaint within sixty days after service has been made under this
section.
"(e) No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United
States or of a State against a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof,
or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant es-
tablishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A
copy of any such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or
political subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in this section.
"§ 1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a for-
eign state
"Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act the property in the United
States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and exe-
cution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.
"§ 1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution
"(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in
section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the
United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or
from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States
or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if-
"(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in
aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may pur-
port to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, or
"(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based, or
"(3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in prop-
erty which has been taken in violation of international law or which has
been exchanged for property taken in violation of international law, or
"(4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in prop-
erty-
"(A) which is acquired by succession or gift, or
"(B) which is immovable and situated in the United States: Pro-
vided, That such property is not used for purposes of maintaining a
diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the Chief of such
mission, or
"(5) the property consists of any contractual obligation or any pro-
ceeds from such a contractual obligation to indemnify or hold harmless
the foreign state or its employees under a policy of automobile or other
liability or casualty insurance covering the claim which merged into the
judgment.
"(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial ac-
tivity in the United States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of
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execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the
United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if-
"(1) the asency or instrumentality has waived its immunity from at-
tachment in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or im-
plicitly, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the agency or
instrumentality may purport to effect except in accordance with the
terms of the waiver, or
"(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instru-
mentality is not immune by virtue of section 1605(a) (2), (3), or (5), or
1605(b) of this chapter, regardless of whether the property is or was used
for the activity upon which the claim is based.
"(c) No attachment or execution referred to in subsections (a) and (b)
of this section shall be permitted until the court has ordered such attach-
ment and execution after having determined that a reasonable period of
time has elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of any
notice required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.
"(d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of
this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not
be immune from attachment prior to the entry of judgment in any action
brought in a court of the United States or of a State, or prior to the elapse
of the period of time provided in subsection (c) of this section, if-
"(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from attach-
ment prior to judgment, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the
terms of the waiver, and
"(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judg-
ment that has been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign
state, and not to obtain jurisdiction.
"§ 1611. Certain types of property immune from execution
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter,
the property of those organizations designated by the President as being
entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided by
the International Organizations Immunities Act shall not be subject to
attachment or any other judicial process impeding the disbursement of
funds to, or on the order of, a foreign state as the result of an action
brought in the courts of the United States or of the States.
"(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter,
the property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and
from execution, if-
"(1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary
authority held for its own account, unless such bank or authority, or
its parent foreign government, has explicitly waived its immunity
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, notwithstand-
ing any withdrawal of the waiver which the bank, authority or gov-
ernment may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of
the waiver; or
"(2) the property is, or is intended to be, used in connection with a
military activity and
"(A) is of a military character, or
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"(B) is under the control of a military authority or defense
agency."
(b) That the analysis of "PART IV.-JURISDICTION AND VENUE" of ti-
tle 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after-
"95. Customs Court.",
the following new item:
"97. Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States.".
SEC. 5. That section 1391 of title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(f) A civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a)
of this title may be brought-
"(1) in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated;
"(2) in any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a foreign
state is situated, if the claim is asserted under section 1605(b) of this title;
"(3) in any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is
licensed to do business or is doing business, if the action is brought
against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in sec-
tion 1603(b) of this title; or
"(4) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
if the action is brought against a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof.".
SEC. 6. That section 1441 of title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state
to the district court of the United States for the district and division em-
bracing the place where such action is pending. Upon removal the action
shall be tried by the court without jury. Where removal is based upon this
subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be
enlarged at any time for cause shown.".
SEC. 7. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any
foreign state is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are sev-
erable.
SEC. 8. This Act shall take effect ninety days after the date of its enact-
ment.
Approved October 21, 1976.
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UNITED STATES: DEPARTMENT OF STATE REGULATIONS
UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT ON
NOTICE OF SUIT*




SUBCHAPTER J-LEGAL AND RELATED
SERVICES
[Departmental Reg. 108.732]
PART 93-SERVICE ON FOREIGN
STATE
Regulations Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976
On December 14, 1976, a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking was published in the FED-
ERAL REGISTER (41 FR 54495) to amend
Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations
by adding a new Part 93 to Subchapter J
and by changing the title of Subchapter J.
As was stated in that notice, the Secretary of
State is to promulgate, pursuant to section
1608(a) of the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 (Pu. L. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891), regulations prescribing the form of a
"Notice of Suit" which is, in certain circum-
stances, to accompany the service of a sum-
mons and complaint upon a foreign state or
its political subdivisions. Under section
(a)(4) of the Act, the Secretary of State is
also to take steps to transmit certain papers
through diplomatic channels in prescribed
circumstances.
Interested persons were invited to submit
written comments regarding the proposed
regulations not later than January 13, 1977.
Based on consideration of the written com-
ments submitted, the regulations for Part 93,
Subchapter J, Chapter I of Title 22, Code of
Federal-Regulations are hereby adopted as
set forth below.
Effective date: These regulations are effec-
tive January 19, 1977.




Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions is amended by adding a new Part 93 to
Subchapter J and by changing the title of
Subchapter J to read as follows:
SUBCHAPTER J-LEGAL AND RE-
LATED SERVICES
PART 93-SERVICE ON FOREIGN
STATE
SEC.
93.1 Service through the diplomatic chan-
nel.
93.2 Notice of Suit (or of default judg-
ment).
AUTHORITY: Sec. 1608(a), Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583
(28 U.S.C. 1608(a)); sec. 4, 63 Stat. 11, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 2658).
§ 93.1 Service through the diplomatic
channel.
(a) The Director of the Office of Special
Consular Services in the Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs, Department of State
("The Director of Special Consular Serv-
ices"), shall perform the duties of the Secre-
tary of State under section 1608(a)(4) of
Title 28, United States Code.
(b) When the clerk of the court con-
cerned sends documents under section
1608(a)(4), of Title 28, United States Code,
the Director of Special Consular Services
shall promptly ascertain if the documents
include the required copies of the notice of
suit and of the summons and complaint (or
default judgment), and any required transla-
tions. If not, he shall promptly advise the
clerk of the missing items.
(c) Upon receiving the required copies
of documents and any required translations,
the Director of Special Consular Services
shall promptly cause one copy of each such
document and translation ("the docu-
ments") to be delivered-
(I) To the Embassy of the United States
in the foreign state concerned, and the Em-
bassy shall promptly deliver them to the for-
eign ministry or other appropriate authority
of the foreign state, or
(2) If the foreign state so requests or if
otherwise appropriate, to the embassy of the
foreign state in the District of Columbia, or
(3) If (1) and (2) are unavailable,
through an existing diplomatic channel,
* [Reproduced from the U.S. Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 22 (February 2, 1977),
6366-67.]
FOREIGN SO VEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
such as to the embassy of another country
authorized to represent the interests of the
foreign state concerned in the United States.
(d) The documents, when delivered
under paragraph (c) of this section, shall be
accompanied by a diplomatic note of trans-
mittal, requesting that the documents be for-
warded to the appropriate authority of the
foreign state or political subdivision upon
which service is being made. The note shall
state that, under United States law, ques-
tions of jurisdiction and of state immunity
must be addressed to the court and not to
the Department of State, and that it is advis-
able to consult with an attorney in the
United States.
(e) If the documents are delivered under
paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the Embassy
of the United States shall promptly transmit
by diplomatic pouch, to the Director of Spe-
cial Consular Services, a certified copy of
the diplomatic note of transmittal. If the
documents are delivered under paragraph
(c) (2) or (3) of this section, the Director of
Special Consular Services shall prepare a
certified copy of the diplomatic note of
transmittal. In each case, the certification
shall state the date and place the documents
were delivered. The Director of Special
Consular Services shall then promptly send
the certified copy to the clerk of the court
concerned.
§ 93.2 Notice of suit (or of default judg-
ment).
(a) A Notice of Suit prescribed in sec-
tion 1608(a) of Title 28, United States Code,
shall be prepared in the form that appears in
the Annex to this section.
(b) In preparing a Notice of Suit, a party
shall in every instance supply the informa-
tion specified in items I through 5 of the
form appearing in the Annex to this section.
A party shall also supply information speci-
fied in item 6, if notice of a default judgment
is being served.
(c) In supplying the information speci-
fied in item 5, a party shall in simplified lan-
guage summarize the nature and purpose of
the proceeding (including principal allega-
tions and claimed bases of liability), the rea-
sons why the foreign state or political
subdivision has been named as a party in
the proceeding, and the nature and amount
of relief sought. The purpose of item 5 is to
enable foreign officials unfamiliar with
American legal documents to ascertain the
above information.
(d) A party may attach additional pages
to the Notice of Suit to complete informa-
tion under any item.
(e) A party shall attach, as part of the
Notice of Suit, a copy of the Foreign State




(OR OF DEFAULT JUDGMENTI)
1. Title of legal proceeding; full name of
court; case or docket number.
2. Name of foreign state (or political
subdivision) concerned:
3. Identity of the other Parties:
JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
4. Nature of documents served (e.g.,
Summons and Complaint; Default Judg-
ment):
5. Nature and purpose of the proceed-
ings; why the foreign state (or political sub-
division) has been named; relief requested:
6. Date of default judgment (if any):
7. A response to a "Summons" and
"Complaint" is required to be submitted to
the court, not later than 60 days after these
documents are received. The response may
present jurisdictional defenses (including
defenses relating to state immunity):
8. The failure to submit a timely re-
sponse with the court can result in a Default
Judgment and a request for execution to sat-
isfy the judgment. If a default judgment has
been entered, a procedure may be available
to vacate or open that judgment.
9. Questions relating to state immunities
and to the jurisdiction of United States
courts over foreign states are governed by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, which appears in sections 1330,
1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602 through 1611, of
Title 28, United States Code (Pub. L. 94-
583; 90 Stat. 2891).
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